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How does God reward or punish us after death?
After death God either makes us happy in Heaven, or punishes us in
Purgatory or Hell, according to our deeds.
What is Hell?
Hell is the place of everlasting suffering.
What is Purgatory?
Purgatory is a place of punishment, where the souls of the just suffer
after death, until they are entirely purified.
What is Heaven?
Heaven is a place of everlasting happiness for those who have loved
God and served God in this life.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Choosing between purgatory and hell is easy. I argue in this article that
contract may offer sexual marginorities2 a legal purgatory, where they suffer
until they are sufficiently purified to enter the heavenly realm of public rights
(or until the law is purified of anti-gay bias). By sexual marginority I mean
groups generally associated with the gay rights movement (gay men, lesbians,
1. THE BALTIMORE CATECHISM No. 1, Lessons 174-78 (1930) (footnote omitted). I am
grateful to Mary Becker for bringing this source to my attention.
2. Marginority is a cross between marginality (which all women and people of color collec-
tively experience) and minority (which describes gay people as well as particular racial or ethnic
groups, but not straight women). The term marginority also corrects the inaccuracy of the phrases
"women and gays," and "women and Blacks," which suggest that there are neither lesbians nor
African-American women, and certainly not African-American lesbians. Depending on context, it
can also include other disadvantaged groups, such as children. I discuss children as marginorities
to the extent that I discuss the movement of child sexual abuse regulation in my model. For fur-
ther discussion of relations between the categories of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, see Fran-
cisco X. Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"




bisexuals, and transgendered people) and sometimes heterosexual women or
children. My main point is that contractual purgatory is not everything, but it's
not nothing, either.3
I challenge the conventional wisdom that contracting is hazardous for the
health and wealth of people on the margins4 by asserting that sexual
marginorities may be a limited exception to the rule. Specifically, I explore
whether contract may benefit sexual marginorities by offering a purgatory be-
tween the hell of public condemnation and the heaven of public rights.
I began this project with a hunch that gay people may find an unexpected
source of rights in contract. I found, as expected, both practical and theoretical
benefits of gay-related contracts. Inspired by faculty discussions debating the
nature and existence of New Private Law, I expanded the scope of my inquiry
to test whether other sexual regulations might similarly pass through an inter-
mediate stage between public condemnation and publc rights. As expected, I
found a progression between prohibition and license for many sexual regula-
tions. This way station is most clearly contractual for gay people, in that gay
cohabitation and non-discrimination employment contracts fit the classical
definition of contract. While other regulations such as abortion and marital
rape also hover between public condemnation and public rights, the way sta-
tion for these regulations is less clearly contractual. Yet it often turns on con-
sent, which is of course also a crucial element of contract. My project thus is
more to suggest a general pattern than to announce that all sexual regulations
are contractualized at some point.
Toward this end I offer a model that describes how selected sexual regu-
lations progress between the public extremes of condemnation and rights,
sometimes stopping along the way in contract. This contractual way station
may grant rights to sexual marginorities that are unavailable under public law
because of majoritarian moral opposition. If so, contractual purgatory offers an
unexpected safe haven in contract law, unexpected because contract is widely
perceived as a tool for politically conservative ends.'
3. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW
116 (1987) ("Law is not everything in this respect, but it is not nothing either.").
4. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
CREIGfrON L. REV. 441, 444 (1979) ("[Tjhe doctrine of freedom of contract... legitimizes the
natural tendency of the strong to prey on the weak .... ); Kellye Y. Testy, An Unlikely Resurrec-
tion, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 219, 222 (1995) (Feminists have critiqued contract analysis' reliance on
the bargain model of exchange which "presupposes norms of equality (of bargaining power) and
freedom (to choose whether to contract)" and "fuel[s] a market-based economy ... [by] encourag-
ing unadulterated self-interest and commodification.").
5. E.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996). Ann Estin de-
scribes the preference for private over collective decisionmaking as characteristic of economic
thought, and the law and economics school is widely perceived as politically conservative. Ann L.
Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. Can. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 541 (1995).
Law and economics analysis, of course, can also yield progressive results. See, e.g., Ian Ayres,
Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV.
817 (1991); Jennifer Hertz, Note, Physicians with AIDS: A Proposal for Efficient Disclosure, 59
U. On. L. REV. 749 (1992).
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In the descriptive part of this article, I explain how regulation of sodomy,
abortion, miscegenation, fornication, and cross-dressing fit into my model, and
suggest that regulations of child sexual abuse and marital rape traverse a pre-
dictable path in the opposite direction. Then I apply the model in some detail
to gay-related regulations, concluding that gay people are currently at multiple
places in the model, but generally in contractual purgatory.
Finally, after detailing the model and gay regulations' place in it, I
suggest that contractual purgatory may be both practically and theoretically
beneficial to gay people. It will not, however, benefit all marginorities. Het-
erosexual women, for example, already benefit from public rights such as
abortion. Practically speaking, they are able to obtain certain public rights,
such as freedom from employment discrimination. In contrast, gay people are
more likely to obtain modest contractual protections than they are expansive
public rights. As a theoretical matter, the gay community may also benefit
from using tools generally associated with the political right-wing, since doing
so destabilizes categories and thus opens up social spaces that were formerly
closed to gay people.
Another theoretical advantage of contractual purgatory for sexual
marginorities is that contract is an important element of the social construction
of legal personhood, so that enforcing gay-related contracts is an essential step
towards gay people becoming legal persons. Thus, contract serves a crucial
function in shepherding gay people from a position where they are socially
constructed as criminals to a place where they are constructed as full members
of society.
My theory also offers a new role for contract within progressive thought,
a somewhat counterintuitive proposal since contract has been roundly criticized
by progressive scholars. Critical Legal Theorists and Realists have attacked the
political underpinnings of contract on a number of grounds. Some claim con-
tract law is not as private as it claims to be, but is instead public because
elected or politically appointed judges decide which contracts are enforce-
able.6 This critique argues that private contracts are thus not truly private, but
mere reflections of majoritarian values as voiced through judges who represent
and implement class, race, and gender privilege.
A second critique of contract law challenges the legal fiction of consent in
a situation where one or more of the parties did not fully understand the na-
ture of the bargain, or were induced by economic or other inequality in bar-
gaining power to agree to a particular contract.7 A third progressive critique
6. See, e.g., Moris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 586 (1933)
("[Tlhe law of contract may be viewed as a subsidiary branch of public law, as a body of rules
according to which the sovereign power of the state will be exercised as between the parties to a
more or less voluntary transaction."); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract
Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 997, 1094, 1113 (1985) ("Doctrinal arguments cast in terms of public and
private, manifestation and intent, and form and substance ... encourage us to simplify in a way
that denies the complexity, and ambiguity, of human relationships.... [Tlhe world of contract
doctrine [is] ... one in which a comparatively few mediating devices are constantly deployed to
displace and defer the otherwise inevitable revelation that public cannot be separated from private,
or form from substance, or objective manifestation from subjective intent.").
7. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
II10 [Vol. 73:4
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of contract contends that contract favors "unadulterated self-interest and pure
calculation" over trust and community.' Generally, these critics claim that
contract replaces public rights with market rights.9
In contrast, scholars on the political right often champion contract,'
0
which in itself makes contract theory and doctrine suspect to those scholars
who focus on redistributive agendas as a means of benefitting have-nots. I
focus on how contractual purgatory benefits one marginority, arguing that gay-
related contracts can benefit gay people despite the trenchant critique of con-
tract offered by progressive theorists.
Contractual purgatory is of particular relevance to the New Private Law.
New Private Law is a label a group of faculty at the University of Denver has
coined to describe the recent trend in which government entities delegate their
functions to private entities by, for example, privatizing prisons and schools.
In this Symposium, Federico Cheever addresses conservation easements as
environmentally sensitive manifestations of New Private Law, and Roberto
Corrada and Katherine Stone explore some impacts of contractual arbitration
clauses on employment and labor contracts. Clayton Gillette explores the com-
petition between public and private provision of the same goods or services,
and Gary Peller suggests that privatizing education could yield unexpected and
progressive benefits. All of these papers, to a greater or lesser extent, focus on
contract.
I also address contractual issues, but in the context of sexual regulations. I
argue that at least for sexual marginorities, New Private Law might offer a
safe haven from the only other practical alternative: criminalization. Thus, at
least some marginorities might benefit from New Private Law, despite its
public presentation as a politically conservative tool to replace public rights
with market rights."
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (1982) ("The 'free' 'private' market is really an artifact of
public violence."); Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 764
(1981) ("[C]oercion, including legal coercion, lies at the heart of every bargain. Coercion is inher-
ent in each party's legally protected threat to withhold what is owned. The right to withhold cre-
ates the right to force submission to one's own terms."); see also Nancy Ehrenreich, The Coloni-
zation of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 498 (1993) (critiquing consent to caesarean sections as be-
ing "intimately tied to ideological structures" relating to race, class, and gender).
8. See, e.g., Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV.
561, 644-45 (1983).
9. Patricia Williams has challenged the dichotomy between public rights and contract rights
by pointing out that for some minorities the right to contract is an essential element of
personhood, given that their ancestors were the object of contract rather than contracting parties.
Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 408 (1987) ("I am still engaged in a struggle to set up transactions
at arms' length, as legitimately commercial, and to portray myself as a bargainer of separate
worth, distinct power, sufficient rights to manipulate commerce, rather than to be manipulated as
the object of commerce.").
10. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 53 (1995) (ar-
guing that voluntary exchange is one of six simple rules governing all law); CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1 (1981).
11. Any refuge New Private Law might offer some marginorities contradicts the perception
of it as a tool of the right which will inevitably hurt the have-nots. This perception is often
grounded in concrete examples, such as Roberto Corrada's and Katherine Stone's prediction that
employees and union members will enjoy fewer rights under private than public processes.
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II. THE MODEL
In this model, public and private are separate spheres linked by a horseshoe
progression at one end of which is public condemnation (usually through
criminalization) and at the other, public rights. 2 Contract sits midway in the
trajectory between the two public extremes, with decriminalization between
contract and criminalization. The model also reflects the role of different
branches of government. The judiciary perches at the top, enforcing private
agreements, and the legislature 3 sits at either end of the model, legislating
morality through either public condemnation or public rights.
I COITACr
[ DECRIMNALZAT7ON I
PUBUC RIGHTS PUBIC CONDEMNATION
(CRIMINALIZATION)
Public condemnation takes its most obvious form in criminal statutes.
Contractualization is similarly straightforward, involving judicial enforcement
of obligations agreed to by private parties. 4 The category of public rights,
12. Another way to view my model is as an upside-down pendulum. The extremes are public
rights or condemnation, but regulations often pass through private contract on their way to either
extreme. Alan K. Chen, "Meet the New Boss...", 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1253, 1259 n.46 (1996).
13. I describe public rights as legislatively created because some, such as the right to be free
from some employment discrimination embodied in Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are
legislatively created. While other public rights, such as reproductive freedom, are recognized by
courts if they are grounded in the Constitution, they can also be deemed legislative if the Con-
stitution is conceived as a super-statute. The Constitution is, in any case, more like the text of a
criminal statute than a contract between private parties, in that the Constitution and statutes are
both government-created documents, while a private contract is created by private parties.
14. While contracts such as cohabitation contracts are in contractual purgatory, other consen-
1112 [Vol. 73:4
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however, is susceptible to many meanings. I use the term to include at least
three things: (1) constitutional protection from invidious discrimination and
protection of fundamental rights; (2) legislative protection from discrimination
on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, or other categories of invidious
discrimination; and (3) a privilege to take action without fear of punish-
ment. 5 While these public rights cover a broad range, they all reflect either
freedom from state interference with an activity or protection from invidious
discrimination. For example, there is a public right to marital rape where the
state does not criminalize it,'6 and a public right to be free from race
sual relations also fall within the way station. Consent (rather than offer, acceptance, and consider-
ation) is key to determining whether a regulated behavior is in the category of condemnation,
public rights, or the contractual way station. For example, marital rape was a public right when
the wife's consent was inferred from marriage vows. It has since been criminalized, but her con-
sent is often inferred despite considerable evidence to the contrary. Abortion is similarly in con-
tractual purgatory when a woman and her doctor can legally agree to terminate her pregnancy. But
both these regulations tip toward criminalization when moral condemnation of the activity makes
consent irrelevant.
15. The last meaning is illustrated by the progression of marital rape in my model. Until
recently, marital rape was an oxymoron because rape was defined as forcible sex with a person
not the defendant's wife. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 8 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER &
KATHERINE B. SILBAUGH, A GtiDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 35-43 (1996). But it has since
progressed from a privilege toward a crime.
16. Under Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's jurisprudential scheme, my use of the term right here
may also mean privilege as I use it in my third example-to take action without fear of legal
liability. The first two examples (constitutional and legislative protections against discrimination)
are likely Hohfeldian rights because they confer an affirmative claim against another person. Hoh-
feld's privilege is an absence of duty to refrain. Under the marital rape exemption a husband has a
privilege to rape his wife, which means that he has no duty to refrain from raping his wife. See
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913), reprinted in WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED TO JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER ESSAYS 23 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923).
Sometimes right and privilege can apply to the same sexual regulation. If Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), is read as granting gay people public rights through protection under the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, then they have both a privilege and a right. The
privilege is that gay people no longer have a duty to refrain from being or acting gay to escape
legal liabilities, and the right is that gay people have an affirmative claim against state entities
denying them equal protection of the law on the basis of sexual orientation.
Hohfeld described eight categories in analytical jurisprudence: (1) right (an affirmative
claim against another); (2) privilege ("one's freedom from the right or claim of another"); (3) no-
right ("absence of right"); (4) power (legal ability to alter legal relations); (5) liability (experienced
by the one whose legal relations are altered by power); (6) immunity ("exemption from legal pow-
er"); (7) disability (lacking power to alter someone's legal relations); and (8) duty (obligation).
Hohfeld's opposites and correlatives further illustrate the right/privilege relationship regarding
sexual regulations:
Hohfeld's jural opposites:
right privilege power immunity
no-right duty disability liability
Hohfeld's jural correlatives:
right privilege power immunity
duty no-right liability disability
The list above illustrates that where wives now have a right to be free from marital rape
(i.e., an affirmative claim against their husbands), they formerly had no-right under the marital
exemption (i.e., they could not bring a claim). As correlatives, the wife's right to claim marital
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discrimination under Title VII. These public rights represent a dramatic change
from prior law, a change which can be characterized as the transition of wom-
en and racial minorities from being legal objects to being legal subjects.
I mainly focus on contracts benefitting gay people, because gay people
seem to be moving from public condemnation toward contractual purgatory,
and thus provide a good example of movement within my model. Perhaps
because they are in transition, gay people find themselves in multiple places
on the continuum from criminalization to public rights. Sodomy is
criminalized in many states, 7 and yet contracts which benefit gay people are
enforced, sometimes even in states with sodomy laws.' 8 Moreover, some le-
gal landscapes show early signs of budding public rights for gay people such
as state or municipal legislation affording protection from sexual orientation
discrimination or granting domestic partnership benefits.
Two important and just-planted seeds of gay public rights are the Supreme
Court's recent invalidation of Colorado's anti-gay constitutional amendment in
Romer v. Evans 9 and Hawaii's recognition of same-sex marriages under the
Hawaii constitution in Baehr v. Miike.2" The generativity of Evans became
immediately apparent when the Court summarily vacated and remanded a
similar case to the Sixth Circuit (the Circuit had upheld Cincinnati's city char-
ter amendment which had denied protection against sexual orientation discrim-
ination).2' But the long term impact of Evans and Baehr is uncertain; a legal
or political backlash may keep gay people out of the heaven of public rights.
In terms of my model, the contested legal status of homosexuality is evidenced
by simultaneous criminalization, recognition through contract, and public right
status, sometimes all in the same jurisdiction.22
rape is paired with the husband's correlative duty to refrain from raping his wife. Similarly, the
opposite nature of privilege and duty is illustrated by the husband's privilege to rape his wife (the
absence of a duty to refrain) under the marital rape exemption and the opposite duty of a husband
to refrain from raping his wife when the marital rape exemption has been repealed. Finally, mari-
tal rape fits into the Hohfeldian correlative of privilege and no-right in that when the husband has
the privilege to rape his wife, the wife has no-right (i.e., she cannot make a legally recognized
claim of marital rape). In sum, under the marital rape exemption the husband has a privilege to
rape his wife and the wife has no-right (no claim). When the exemption is repealed the wife has a
right (claim) and the husband has a duty to refrain from non-consensual sex.
This overlap of right and privilege in my definition of public rights is intended to craft a
category which encompasses both freedom to and freedom from. To give another example, legal
protection of reproductive choices represents both the freedom from state interference and the
freedom to get an abortion.
17. Twenty-four states criminalize sodomy. Brenda S. Thornton, The New International
Jurisprudence on the Right to Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB.
L. REv. 725, 726 n.2 (1995).
18. See, e.g., Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (enforcing lesbian cohabitation
contract and excluding all evidence of the relationship under the parol evidence rule).
19. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
20. No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec. 3, 1996).
21. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996)
(granting certiorari, summarily vacating Sixth Circuit opinion, and remanding to Sixth Circuit for
consideration in light of Romer v. Evans).
22. Georgia is remarkable in its concurrent treatment of homosexuality as a crime, a contrac-
tual right, and a public right. It criminalizes sodomy, yet enforces same-sex cohabitation contracts.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992);
Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. 1979). Georgia also affords protection against discrimination
1114 [Vol. 73:4
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Contractual purgatory is important because it offers a resting place for gay
people, safe from public condemnation, while they wait to achieve public
rights. This safe harbor is particularly important since courts are rarely on the
cutting edge of social change. Perhaps judicial reluctance to create social
change (as compared to reflecting it) is due to the nature of law; it follows
precedent rather than cutting new paths."
While Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade seem to contradict
this point, in that they symbolize tremendous judicially-mandated strides for
African-Americans and women, these cases in fact were the product of
decades of litigation and public education efforts on racial segregation and
illegal abortion. More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans has
indicated a willingness to recognize some constitutional protection for gay
people, a dramatic shift from its position just a decade ago when it venomous-
ly upheld sodomy statutes as applied to gay people.24 Perhaps the past decade
has included sufficient social change in gay people's place in society that the
Court could more comfortably join the growing social consensus supporting
some gay rights in 1996 than it could go against the anti-gay consensus in
1986.
At first glance, contract may seem to be an unexpected refuge for sexual
marginorities. Decades of progressive scholarship have eloquently critiqued the
classical liberal foundations of contract,25 and classical liberalism's renais-
sance in the academy and in the courts is generally associated with political
conservatism. 2 6 Like Rasputin, the theory of voluntary exchange continues to
on the basis of sexual orientation in Atlanta and Fulton County. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FUND,
STATES, CITIES AND COUNTIES WHICH PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION [hereinafter HRC LIST] (document on file with the author). But see City of Atlanta v.
McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995) (holding that city grant of health insurance to domestic
partners of city employees was ultra vires). The contested status of gay people in Georgia is fur-
ther illustrated by Atlanta's passage of another domestic partnership ordinance in an attempt to
grant the benefits within the parameters dictated by the Georgia Supreme Court in McKinney.
Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Sued over Its Law on Benefits to the Unwed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1996, at 25. Minnesota is another jurisdiction in which gay people are at multiple places in my
model: it has a state statute barring sexual orientation discrimination and a sodomy law. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996) (criminalizing "carnally knowing any person by
the anus or by or with the mouth"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (1996) (extending protection
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, real property transactions,
public accommodations, public services, education, credit, and business). And like Atlanta,
Minneapolis' domestic partnership benefits were ruled ultra vires in Lilly v. City of Minneapolis,
527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
23. Michael 1. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1933-34 (1995) (discussing the "myth of the Court as
'countermajoritarian hero'). I thank Clayton Gillette for bringing this point to my attention. For
further discussion of the Court's role in breaking new social ground, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
24. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
25. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIvE CRITIQUE 172 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Morton Horowitz, The Triumph of
Contract, in ALAN C. HUTCHISON, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 104 (1989); Mensch, supra note 7.
26. See EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53 (1995) (suggesting voluntary exchange as one of six
simple rules for a complex world); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (upholding contractual arbitration clause regarding age discrimination claim); Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Culver, 640 F. Supp. 725 (D. Kan. 1986) (enforcing promissory note against an
unsophisticated debtor who did not understand what he was signing).
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live, despite the various allegedly fatal blows dealt it by Realists, Neo-Realists,
and Critical Legal Theorists.27 Richard Epstein is typical of conservative scho-
lars in championing voluntary contractual exchange as one of his six simple
rules for a complex world.2" Epstein skirts problems of differential power by
universalizing the "logic of mutual gain" and positing that contracting parties
are differently situated only in their purportedly natural variation in skill and
willingness to bear risks.29 Power differences are thus either inevitable or
matters of choice for Epstein and do not compromise the value of contract.
Without agreeing with Epstein's blithe acceptance of power differentials
between contracting parties, I posit here that while contract is not everything,
it's not nothing either.30 Specifically, contract may be a useful way station for
sexual regulations en route from public condemnation to public rights.
The way station model may also work for other sexual regulations. I have
tracked the progression of sodomy, abortion, miscegenation, fornication, and
cross-dressing from criminalization to public rights, sometimes stopping in
contractual purgatory. However, other sexual regulations, such as marital rape
and child sexual abuse, have progressed in the opposite direction: from public
rights to criminalized activities.3' Diagrammatically, these sexual progressions
look like this:
A nice illustration of the tension between classical and more Realist contract interpretation
is embodied in Judge Kozinski's defense of classical formalism in a case where he nevertheless
followed the Realism established in California law by Justice Traynor 20 years earlier. In Trident
Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988), Judge Kozinski reluctantly
allowed the parties to introduce parol evidence to the contract because he felt obliged to do so
under Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal.
1968). In Thomas Drayage, Justice Traynor had allowed the parties to introduce extrinsic evidence
to explain a contract term, reasoning that reliance on bare words on a page "is a remnant of a
primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of words .... Words, however, do
not have absolute and constant referents." Id. at 644. In Trident Center, Judge Kozinski reluctantly
followed Thomas Drayage because a federal court is bound to follow state substantive law, but
roundly criticized it, stating that California has
turned its back on the notion that a contract can ever have a plain meaning discernible
by a court without resort to extrinsic evidence ... [so that] even when the transaction is
very sizeable, even if it involves only sophisticated parties, even if it was negotiated
with the aid of counsel, even if it results in contract language that is devoid of ambigu-
ity, costly and protracted litigation cannot be avoided if one party has a strong enough
motive for challenging the contract.
Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 568-69. For further discussion of the California parol evidence rule,
see Susan J. Martin, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There Is a Parol Evidence Rule in California-The
Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 1 (1995).
27. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
28. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53. The rules are: (1) self ownership; (2) first possession; (3)
voluntary exchange; (4) protection against aggression; (5) limited privilege for cases of necessity;
and (6) compensated takings. Id.
29. Id. at 79.
30. See MACKINNON, supra note 3.
31. Space prevents me from addressing all sexual regulations. Among those I omit are those
governing pornography, prostitution, and nude dancing. These regulations may well fit into my
model. If social consensus recognizes a victim in prostitution, then the progressive move would be
to criminalize it. But if the only victim in prostitution is the moral climate, or if the victimization
of prostitutes is a function of criminalization, then the progressive move might be to contractualize










In comparing the progressions of various sexual regulations, it appears
that the direction in which the regulation is moving depends on whether the
crime has an identifiable victim. Defining progressive as a move from politi-
cally conservative to politically progressive, victimless crimes should go from
right to left in the model, while crimes with formerly legally invisible victims
(women and children) should go from left to right.32 For example, sodomy
32. Abortion presents a harder case given the uncertain status of the fetus and the possibility
of female victims. Anti-abortion laws were more likely to be enforced if a woman died, and thus
was a victim. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 349
(1993). This pattern suggests that as long as abortion is perceived as victimless, it will not be
criminalized. But, of course, anti-choice advocates would contend that the fetus is a full human
being, and thus a victim of abortion. Pro-choice advocates, in contrast, would contend that the
fetus is not fully human, or at least less human than the mother, and thus the fetus cannot be a
victim. Perhaps this uncertain status question is part of the reason that abortion is all over my
model. If there is no social consensus (let alone legal consensus) on whether abortion is a victim-
less crime, then abortion regulations would be expected to careen from public rights to public
condemnation, perhaps stopping at contract in between. The uncertain status of abortion may also
turn on whether being pro-choice is identified with a progressive position. While most people
would put pro-choice positions under a progressive umbrella, some disabled rights advocates argue
that terminating a pregnancy because of evidence that the child, if born, would suffer a disability,
is eugenic rather than progressive.
Also relevant to my model is the fact that decriminalization of victimless crimes is a mod-
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between consenting adults is a victimless crime, so a progressive trajectory
prefers individual autonomy33 over morality-based legislation and the arrow
should go from criminalization toward public rights. In contrast, where there is
an identifiable victim (as in marital rape and child sexual abuse) the pro-
gressive pattern is from public right to criminalization. In other words, the
progressive effect of the pattern is that victims get legal protection from abuse,
and that victimless crimes get reclassified as non-crimes or even public rights.
Under my model, the transition from criminalization to public rights may
include a stop at contract, particularly if the victimless quality of the crime is
contested. But, of course, the progression to contract will only benefit sexual
marginorities if the activity is currently criminalized, making the move to
contract an opportunity to contract around an otherwise hostile and immutable
rule. Mary Becker's discussion of differences between heterosexual and same-
sex cohabitation contracting nicely illustrates this point.34
Becker differentiates between gay and straight relationship contracts. She
explains how these couples are differently situated both in terms of the
partners' relation to one another and in terms of the couple's relation to the
government. In relation to one another, gay couples are more likely equal
because they share sexual identity and, particularly for lesbians, a normative
preference for equality within the relationship. In contrast, a heterosexual
couple by definition contains one man and one woman, so there is always a
gender-based power imbalance between the partners. Thus, Becker points out,
a heterosexual relationship contract is more likely tainted by unequal bargain-
ing power of the parties, since the man has more social power and is also
socialized to value individuality over the coupled unit. This heterosexual pow-
er imbalance is exacerbated, Becker notes, by female socialization to be giving
rather than autonomous, resulting in a situation where heterosexual relationship
contracts will likely benefit the more powerful (male) party at the expense of
the less powerful (female) party. This outcome is obviously not progressive.
Becker further discusses the relationship of the couple to the state. Hetero-
sexual couples, of course, are recognized through family law, and family law
rules often protect weaker parties in a marriage through provisions such as
temporary maintenance for a non-wage earning spouse. Gay couples, in
contrast, are legally invisible, if not criminalized. As a result, heterosexual
in contrast, laws did not distinguish between sins and crimes. Id. at 34.
33. Autonomy per se has no set political valence. Classical contract theory valorized
autonomy, as does liberational legal theory. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53; Valdes, supra
note 2, at 10, 31 (identifying autonomy as a goal and using the term liberational to describe femi-
nist and critical race theories). Richard Posner has championed many of the contracts I advocate
here, indicating that both progressive and conservative/libertarian thinkers have good reason for
focussing on autonomy as a normative goal. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 265-66,
313 (1992). I thank Dan Farber for this insight.
34. Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENV. U. L. REv.
1169 (1996). Penelope E. Bryan has contended in a similar vein that women obtain better out-
comes in lawyer-negotiated divorce settlements than in mediation. Penelope Bryan, Killing Us
Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 441, 445 (1992). If medi-
ation is seen as negotiating a contract, then Bryan's arguments suggest that heterosexual women
might suffer negative results in prenuptial contract negotiations for many of the same reasons that
they suffer more under mediation than litigation.
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relationship contracts are entered "in the shadow of family law rules"35 and
substantively tend to relieve the more powerful party of his obligations under
those family law rules. Becker also contends that gay relationship contracts,
unlike heterosexual ones, tend to promote equality between the parties rather
than serve the powerful party's interest at the expense of the weaker party. As
such, gay relationship contracts are progressive because they provide equality
where the law would enforce inequality, while heterosexual relationship
contracts are regressive because they chip away legal protections for weaker
parties.
But the fact that heterosexual relationship contracting is often regressive
does not impair my model's relevance. To the contrary, it illustrates the differ-
ence between a situation where contractual purgatory is progressive and one
where contractual purgatory is regressive. Contracting benefits sexual margin-
orities where the current rule is hostile. If, as in the case of heterosexual rela-
tionships, the public right benefits heterosexual women, then contract is re-
gressive rather than progressive. In sum, the move to contract often does not
benefit heterosexual women because it qualifies a friendly public right, but it
does benefit gay people, because it offers an opportunity to contract around a
hostile default rule of public condemnation.
While my focus is on progressions that benefit sexual marginorities, the
model is equally useful to understand changes in sexual regulations from a
conservative perspective. The Religious Right, for example, would likely pre-
fer that the arrows go in the opposite direction than they appear in my model.
For example, the Christian Coalition would prefer that abortion be
criminalized rather than considered a public right. But if reproductive choice is
too politically popular to criminalize, the Christian Coalition could push it to
contract as an intermediate measure. Implied conditions on abortion such as
funding limitations and waiting periods arguably make parts of reproductive
rights contractual, illustrating the efficacy of this strategy.36 Once they have
transformed a public right to a contractual one, the Christian Coalition could
then continue to whittle away at the contract right, hoping to sufficiently erode
the public view of it as an entitlement, thus making criminalization possible.
While my approach takes the opposite position as a normative matter (favoring
personal autonomy over morality-based legislation for victimless crimes), the
model works just as well if the Christian Coalition makes the normative
choice that victimless crimes should be criminalized to enforce majoritarian morality.
7
35. Becker, supra note 34, at 1174.
36. As in much of this article, I use contract loosely, rather than in the sense of mutual as-
sent supported by consideration. Limitations on abortion access (particularly those related to fund-
ing) contractualize public rights to reproductive choice by providing that only women who can
form a contract with a physician to perform the abortion have a right to one. Waiting periods and
other qualifications on the abortion right similarly require the woman to agree to particular condi-
tions in order to exercise her public right to abortion. In other words, the state provides many of
the terms of the agreement between the woman and her doctor. While this is not a classical con-
tract, it does reflect some conditions on the public right that could be characterized as limiting it
by adding terms. Consent is key to contract, and also to my model. As conditions on abortion
limit what a woman can (and cannot) agree to, abortion shifts away from a public right/privilege
and toward the moralized public condemnation where her consent is irrelevant. It remains decrimi-
nalized, but is a much weaker public right than it was before.
37. Perhaps the Christian Coalition already recognizes the utility of contractual purgatory to
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All conservatives, of course, do not take identical positions on contract as
applied to gay people. Judge Posner, for example, seems to approve of the
gradual replacement of marriage as status with cohabitation as contract.3" He
further proposes that domestic partnerships be available as an "intermediate
step" between the ban on gay marriage and full legal recognition of gay rela-
tionships. 9 Moreover, unlike Becker, Posner suggests that contracts actually
protect heterosexual women more than family law rules that allow no-fault
divorce.' Thus, my model works for both conservatives and progressives, but
it is important to keep in mind that not all conservatives (nor all progressives)
will want the arrows to go in the same direction.
All marginorities, of course, are not similarly situated in all ways. Be-
cause more established groups are more likely to enjoy public rights, contracts
may be most advantageous to the marginorities subject to more hostile public
rules. For example, gay people may benefit from contractual purgatory be-
cause gay relationships are more likely to be criminalized than enjoy any pub-
lic rights. On the other hand, heterosexual women would not benefit from
contractual purgatory because abortion is a public right, and, as Becker points
out, public rules governing heterosexual women often are more favorable than
a contract would be. If contract can be a safe haven for gay people, then it (or
parts of it) may present both strategic possibilities for subverting conservative
agendas, and also open a pragmatic route to attain some legal protections until
the general public is ready to recognize gay people's public rights.
There are two potential problems with my model: (1) it presupposes a
distinction between public and private; and (2) it contains a normative assump-
tion. The first problem turns on the public/private debate, which has raged for
decades without real resolution. Rhetorical and legal organization continue to
turn on a designation of spheres as either public or private, regardless of the
indeterminate border between the two."' My model, in turn, situates itself in
roll back public rights for sexual marginorities. If so, then it may have recognized that contract is
a particularly valuable tool if progressives are shy about using it for their own purposes. I thank
Julie Nice for this insight.
38. POSNER, supra note 33, at 264-65 ("'The groundwork has been laid for the replacement
of marriage by ... contractual cohabitation .... Today, spouses who want a really durable rela-
tionship must try to create one by contract or by informal commitments.'); see also Jane E.
Larson, The New Home Economics, 10 CoNsT. COMMENT. 443, 450-51 (1993) (describing how
Posner would replace marriage with contractual cohabitation and recognizing same-sex domestic
partnerships as consistent with Posner's bioeconomic theory of sexuality).
39. POSNER, supra note 33, at 313; Martha M. Ertman, Denying the Secret of Joy: A Cri-
tique of Posner's Theory of Sexuality, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1485, 1501 (1993) (describing how
Posner recommends domestic partnership as an "intermediate solution" to the problem of gay
people seeking marriage rights).
40. Judge Posner has contended that heterosexual women are better able to protect
themselves and their children from "abandonment by the child's father" under contract rather than
family law. POSNER, supra note 33, at 266.
41. For a discussion of the public/private distinction, see, e.g., Symposium, The Pub-
liclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1299 (1982); Cohen, supra note 6; Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POE. Scl. Q. 470 (1923); Fran-
ces Olsen, The Myth of State Non-Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835
(1985); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). For a recent progressive defense of the public/private distinction, see
Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the PubliclPrivate Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
1120 [Vol. 73:4
CONTRACTUAL PURGATORY
the context of the public and the private realms, since the discrete categories
of private purgatory, public rights, and public condemnation presuppose some
difference between public and private actors and rules. If public is the same as
private because the judicial branch of government enforces contracts, then
there is no public/private distinction between contract and either public con-
demnation or public rights. But the rhetoric of public condemnation and public
rights remains markedly different from the rhetoric of private law. Whether
the distinction is real or merely rhetorical, it has tremendous impact on actual
lives, and may also offer possibilities for increased legal recognition for some
marginorities.
The second issue, the normativity inherent in my model, is a function of
what I define as progressive. I focus on marginorities, and define progressive
to mean legal maneuvers that benefit the marginority. The reason for my pref-
erence for marginorities over majorities is simple: majorities are better able to
protect their interests through the political process. People on the margins, in
contrast, must either rely on the courts to protect them, or on the majority to
be sympathetic.42 As a result, I am more concerned with gay people's rights
to freedom from discrimination than with the Christian Coalition's contention
that its members feel oppressed when gay people have equal rights.
My preference is normative; I believe the marginalized group has a great-
er entitlement to equality than a majority group has to hegemony. But, as
noted above, my model works for conservatives as well as for progressives. A
conservative need only switch the direction of the arrows to return victimless
crimes to the public condemnation category, and return to husbands the enti-
tlement to rape their wives.
To summarize: my model suggests that contract offers marginorities a
private purgatory between public condemnation and public rights. If I am
right, then contract offers sexual marginorities some legal advantage. If sexual
marginorities find a home, however modest, in contract law, then contract
cannot be an exclusive tool of the political right. Indeed, because contract is
so often associated with conservatism, progressive appropriation of contract
offers unique opportunities for subversion and ultimate social change.
42. Kenneth Sherrill, The Political Power of Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals, PS: POLMCAL
SC. & POL. 469 (Sept. 1996) ("In electoral politics [gay and bisexual] voters must be dependent
on the support of heterosexuals in order to win elections."). Sherrill notes that while even New
York City does not have an electoral jurisdiction in which gay people are a majority, gay people
can still form critical masses in cities where they are sufficiently numerous and organized to bring
about favorable legislation. The literature on collective action similarly suggests that marginorities
may be politically successful where they are in high density because they can monitor themselves,
build coalitions, and avoid some free-riding by larger groups. Of course, the procedural advantages
of collective action in a small group may be outweighed if the marginority is more disadvantaged
by majority hostility than it is advantaged by the ease of action in a small group. Perhaps gay
people are more successful locally than nationally because the procedural benefits of being a small
group are present locally but not nationally. Moreover, gay people are difficult to organize be-
cause identifying the interest group members can be hard since gay people, unlike people of color
or many ethnic minorities, are generally not identifiable by sight or last name. Moreover, many
gay people continue to obscure their sexual orientation even from other gay people in order to
avoid discrimination. I thank Clayton Gillette for identifying the collective action benefits in being
a marginority.
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III. PROGRESSION OF SEXUAL REGULATIONS
In an effort to test my hypothesis that contract is a private purgatory be-
tween public condemnation and public rights, I will briefly sketch the histor-
ical regulation of selected sexual regulations, including sodomy, abortion,
miscegenation, fornication, cross-dressing, marital rape, and child sexual
abuse. These regulations have gone in both directions on the diagram: from
right to left (from criminalization toward public rights), and from left to right
(from public rights to criminalization). As I've said, the overarching progres-
sive pattern seems to be that victimless crimes go from right to left, and
crimes where the female and child victims were only recently recognized as
such go from left to right. But regardless of the starting point, contract is often




A. Salvation from Criminalization to Public Rights
1. Sodomy
Sodomy in some form has long been criminalized under both English and
American common law. 3 In upholding Georgia's criminal sodomy statute,
43. WAYNE C. BARTEE & ALICE F. BARTEE, LITIGATING MORALITY: AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT AND ITS ENGLISH ROOTS 31-37 (1992). In "ancient times," sodomy was punished by
ecclesiastical authorities, but was not a crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. I at 358 (1980).
Historian John Boswell suggests, however, that this criminalization is relatively recenL JOHN




the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick explained that "sodomy was a
criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original
thirteen states when they ratified the Bill of Rights."'  While scholars contest
whether same-sex sexual conduct per se has been criminalized since colonial
times," the fact remains that the Supreme Court has upheld sodomy statutes
as applied to gay consensual sex. I have accordingly placed sodomy on the
criminal side of the diagram, based on Bowers. But I trace a dotted line be-
tween sodomy and contract to reflect some limited recognition of gay people's
private contractual rights. Some courts have enforced gay cohabitation con-
tracts and employment contracts forbidding sexual orientation discrimination.
But other courts have refused to enforce same-sex cohabitation contracts be-
cause of anti-gay sentiments,' and even where the courts have enforced
and 1300, homosexual activity passed from being completely legal in most of Europe to incurring
the death penalty in all but a few contemporary legal compilations."). American colonists enforced
criminal prohibitions on sodomy, executing at least five men for sodomy or buggery in the late
seventeenth century. JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 30 (1988).
44. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986). According to the Model Penal Code,
sodomy "was received by the American colonies as a common-law felony." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.2 cmt. 1 at 358.
45. Anne Goldstein has persuasively challenged the Bowers Court's reliance on the purport-
ed historical criminalization of same-sex sexual activity as justifying contemporary criminalization.
Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988). Goldstein points out the
flaws in the Court's interpretation of eighteenth and nineteenth century views of sodomy, arguing
that homosexuality (i.e., sexuality as something a person is rather than simply does) as we now
understand it did not exist prior to the late nineteenth century, so that before the "invention of
'homosexuality,' sexual touchings between men were determined to be licit or illicit according to
criteria that applied equally to heterosexual practices, such as the parts of the body involved, the
relative status of the parties, and whether the sexual drama conformed to sex role stereotypes." Id.
at 1088 (citing Arthur N. Gilbert, Conceptions of Homosexuality and Sodomy in Western History,
6 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 57, 61 (1981) (homosexuals not conceptualized as identifiable segment of
society until late nineteenth century); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USE
OF PLEASURE: VOL. 2, at 220 (R. Hurley trans., 1985) (discussing ancient Greek position that
"masculine" partner should dominate "feminine" partner regardless of biological sex); Jean-Louis
Flandrin, Sex in Married Life in the Early Middle Ages, in WESTERN SEXUALITY: PRACTICE AND
PRECEPT IN PAST AND PRESENT TIMES 120-21 (P. Aries & A. Bejin ed., 1985) (discussing accept-
able sexual positions in fifteenth century Europe)). Historically then, until the 1870s, legal regula-
tion of sodomy proscribed particular conduct, regardless of whether it occurred between same-sex
or opposite-sex partners. It seems arguable, then, that criminalization of particular acts only if they
are done by same-sex partners may be only a decade old. Bowers may be both the first and the
highest legal authority allowing states to criminalize conduct by same-sex partners and protect the
very same conduct if performed by opposite-sex partners. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188. The Bowers
Court explained,
John and Mary Doe were also plaintiffs in this action .... The District Court held, how-
ever, that because they had neither sustained, nor were in immediate danger of sustain-
ing, any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute, they did not have proper
standing to maintain the action.... The only claim properly before the Court, therefore,
is Hardwick's challenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual homosexual
sodomy. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as ap-
plied to other acts of sodomy.
Id. at 188 n.2 (emphasis added). Shortly after deciding Bowers, the Court denied certiorari in a
case where the Oklahoma appellate court struck down a sodomy law as applied to a heterosexual
couple. Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986).
Viewed as a decision redefining sodomy as an acceptable method of persecuting gay people, rath-
er than upholding sodomy statutes as applied to gay people, Bowers is judicial activism in the
extreme, rather than the banal recitation of millennia of moral teaching that it purports to be.
46. See, e.g., Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981); Seward v. Mentrup, 622
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same-sex cohabitation contracts, they often require that the contract look more
like a business arrangement than a heterosexual marriage contract.4'
2. Abortion
The history of American abortion regulation suggests a progression from
decriminalization to criminalization to public rights, and possibly back toward
contractual purgatory. The common law did not interfere with a woman who
chose to terminate her pregnancy before viability.' Abortion was thus essen-
tially decriminalized through the first half of the nineteenth century.49 There
were no criminal statutes prohibiting the procedure, and professional abortion-
ists widely advertised their services.5" Early abortion laws restricted access to
abortion after quickening, but were rarely enforced.5' Later abortion laws cri-
minalized all abortion, penalizing both the woman and the person performing
the abortion. 2 Thus, abortion moved from being decriminalized53 to being a
crime between the colonial era and the late nineteenth century.
Then, in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a public right to pre-
viability abortion.54 Roe v. Wade, understood within my model, shows the
N.E.2d 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
47. See e.g., Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (enforcing contractual agreement
between former lovers and excluding all evidence of the relationship under the parol evidence
rule).
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-36 & n.21 (1973); Brief of 250 American Historians as
Amici Curiae in Support of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Robert Casey, reprinted in part in MARY BECKER, CYNTHIA
GRANT BOWMAN & MORRISON TORREY, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY
364 (1993) [hereinafter Historians' BrieA]. The Historians' brief was written by Jane Larson, Clyde
Spillinger, and Sylvia Law (complete copy of the Brief on file with the author).
Anti-choice briefs in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), argued
that common law, did, in fact, criminalize abortion. BARTEE & BARTEE, supra note 43, at 28.
49. "In the early nineteenth century, neither doctors, women, nor judges necessarily con-
demned [abortion] as long as [it was] performed within the early months of pregnancy .... Laws
enacted between 1820 and 1840 to regulate abortion retained the quickening doctrine and attempt-
ed to protect women from unwanted abortion, rather than to prosecute them." D'EMILIo & FREED-
MAN, supra note 43, at 65-66.
50. Historians' Brief, supra note 48, at 10. In 1871, New York had a population of less than
one million people, and supported 200 full-time abortionists (a figure which does not include doc-
tors who occasionally performed abortions). Moreover, midwives had been providing women herb-
al abortifacients in America for at least a century, and there were no significant efforts to restrict
abortion until the 1860s. But then the newly formed American Medical Association sought to gain
control over abortion by urging legislators to criminalize it. Id. at 10-11.
51. Id. at 12-13.
52. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118 (1973) (citing numerous anti-abortion statutes,
including ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-29, 53-30 (1968);
IDAHO CODE § 18-601 (1948); IND. CODE § 35-1-58-1 (1971); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-
1196 (Vernon 1948)); see also D'EMtuo & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 66 ("Between 1860 and
1890 ... 40 states and territories enacted anti-abortion statutes, many of which rejected the quick-
ening doctrine, placed limitations on advertisements, and helped transfer legal authority for abor-
tion from women to doctors.").
53. In the alternative, abortion was perhaps contractual if the professional abortionists and
midwives could enforce claims for payment for their services.
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The confusing relationship between public and pri-
vate spheres is illustrated by the fact that the Court used a doctrinal constitutional penumbra with-
in the Bill of Rights to recognize a right to privacy. This right protected the decision whether to
carry a child to term from state intervention. I call this privacy right a public right because it is
based on the very public document of the Constitution and controls state action by requiring the
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rapid transition of abortion from a crime to a public right. In the two decades
since Roe, however, the Court has repeatedly qualified the extent to which
abortion is a public right.
One can read the numerous encroachments on the right, such as waiting
periods, parental consent, mandatory education on fetal development, and late-
term abortion bans as state supplied terms to abortion contracts which argu-
ably shift abortion away from a public right and back toward public condem-
nation." Perhaps pre-viability abortion's move back towards public condem-
nation is most apparent in the Court's repeated holdings that Congress can
constitutionally fund childbirth but need not fund abortion.56 Funding limita-
tions mean that a woman has a public right to a pre-viability abortion only if
she can pay for it.57 Adding funding restrictions to other state restrictions on
abortion, such as requiring parental notification or requiring that a patient
watch a fetal development video, further illustrates the contractualization of
abortion through imposition of conditions on the right.58 In other words, a
woman's public right to an abortion is conditional on her ability to contract to
have one performed. These limitations on the public right shifts abortion back
toward contract.
But even these conditions do not make abortion fully contractual. It would
be unlikely for a court to order specific performance of a premarital contract
clause mandating abortion in the event that the couple conceives.59 Even so,
pre-viability abortion is currently somewhere between a public right and a
crime in my model. As such, it hovers around contractual purgatory. Thus, the
trajectory of abortion regulation goes from being decriminalized, to
criminalization, to a public right, and in some cases, backtracks toward con-
tract.'
state to refrain from controlling reproductive decisions in the first trimester.
55. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding informed con-
sent requirements, 24-hour waiting period, parental consent provision, and reporting and record-
keeping requirements, but striking down spousal notification); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417 (1990) (upholding parental notification and waiting periods for minors); Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding restriction of public employees and facilities
for abortions); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding second physician
requirement, second trimester hospitalization requirement, pathology report, and parental notifica-
tion); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding parental notification for unemancipated
minors seeking abortions); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (upholding funding restric-
tions on abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding ban on public funding of
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding funding restrictions on abortions).
56. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding the Department of Health and Human
Services' regulation prohibiting Title X projects' use of federal funds for abortion counseling, re-
ferral, or advocacy of abortion as a method of family planning); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (upholding state's refusal to fund medically necessary abortions while funding childbirth);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state's refusal to fund non-therapeutic abortions
while funding childbirth).
57. In contractual terms, she must give consideration. I thank Nancy Ehrenreich for pointing
out this distinction to me.
58. Many of these restrictions may be seen as arguably contractual in that they allow the
state to impose limiting conditions such as parental notification on an abortion contract. I thank
Julie Nice for this insight.
59. 1 thank Clayton Gillette for this example.
60. For a discussion of Hohfeld's view of rights and privileges, see supra note 16. In
Hohfeldian terms, contractualized abortion may be viewed as a privilege (i.e., absence of duty to
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3. Miscegenation
Like abortion, miscegenation has progressed from decriminalization to
criminalization, with a rapid move to a public right in the late twentieth
century. But the uncontested nature of the conduct as victimless has kept it out
of contractual purgatory. Neither the common law nor English statutes banned
interracial marriage. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, as many
as thirty-eight states had anti-miscegenation statutes.6' Some states also pun-
ished interracial adultery and fornication more severely than adultery or forni-
cation between members of the same race.62
Just a few years before recognizing the public right to abortion in Roe v.
Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the public right to interracial mar-
riage in Loving v. Virginia.63 Loving provides perhaps the most explicit pub-
lic right language of all the sexual regulation cases. Chief Justice Warren
wrote for the Court:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental
to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom
on so insupportable a basis as ... racial classification[]. . . is surely
to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of
law.... Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be in-
fringed by the State.'
The clarity of the miscegenation issue, coupled with the Court's strong lan-
guage, may explain why Loving is the "definitive precedent for the equal
protection standard."65 While marriage is largely contractual, in that the
parties must have the capacity to form and must explicitly agree to the mar-
riage contract, it remains largely status-based. The status element of marriage
is perhaps best illustrated by the statutory and common law limitations on the
parties to a marriage contract: there must be one man and one woman, they
must not be related by birth or affinity, and neither one can be married al-
ready.' These status-oriented characteristics of marriage, coupled with the
refrain), but not a right (an affirmative claim whereby a woman can make the government pay for
exercising her reproductive decisions).
61. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACIsM AND AMERICAN LAW 56 (1980); see also
D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 14 (noting that "interracial marriage ... seems to have
been tolerated during the early years of settlement" in the Chesapeake area in the early seven-
teenth century).
62. See e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding Alabama's more severe
criminal punishments for interracial fornication and adultery than intraracial fornication and adul-
tery on the grounds that the differential punishment was applied to both races), cited in BELL,
supra note 61, at 57. While colonial penalties were initially neutral as to race, Virginia in 1662
doubled fines for interracial sexual offenses such as fornication, adultery, and bastardy and banned
interracial marriage in 1691. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 34-35.
63. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). A few years earlier, the Court had struck down Florida's more severe
penalties for interracial cohabitation and adultery than for intraracial commission of these offenses.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
64. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
65. BELL, supra note 61, at 65.
66. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 207(a), 9A U.L.A. 168 (1987),
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language of Loving v. Virginia, establish the current place of interracial cou-
pling on my model as a public right.
67
4. Fornication
Like sodomy, fornication has progressed from criminalization to regula-
tion by contract. It may, however, have progressed more towards being a pub-
lic right than sodomy. Cohabitation has long been criminalized as fornication,
but was criminalized at common law only if it became a nuisance." Like
sodomy, the prohibition stems from interpretations of the Bible, and was pros-
ecuted through ecclesiastical courts before the state assumed the responsibility.
Although England abandoned secular punishment for adultery and fornication
in the Restoration,' the Puritans reinstated the practice. 7' The trend is again
reversing, and many jurisdictions recently have relaxed or repealed criminal
punishments for adultery and fornication.7 Like abortion and sodomy laws,
criminal prohibitions of adultery and fornication were rarely enforced.72
When they were enforced, it was often for satellite purposes, such as ha-
prohibiting:
(1) a marriage entered into prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage of one of the
parties; (2) a marriage between an ancestor and a descendant, or between a brother and
sister, whether the relationship is by the half of whole blood, or by adoption; (3) a mar-
riage between an uncle and a niece or between an aunt and a nephew, whether the rela-
tionship is by half or whole blood.
Typical of the cases denying same-sex couples the right to marry is Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974). Hawaii mandates that the state recognize same-sex marriage, but the case
is currently being appealed. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec.
3, 1996). The ruling is stayed pending appeal. Susan Essoyan & Bettina Boxall, Gay Marriages
on Hold While Ruling Is Appealed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at A3.
67. I use public right in the sense of something the government will not interfere with. For a
discussion of how the marital rape exemption is a public right to rape since it prohibits the state
from interfering with the husband's decisions regarding marital sex, see infra part III.B.
68. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 430, 431; Kathryn J.
Humphrey, Note, The Right of Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws Regulating Private Con-
sensual Behavior, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1069 (1979) ("Mere fornication was not indictable at
common law; it was the public nature of the act, constituting a nuisance, which brought it within
the common law's purview.").
69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication (citing Geoffrey May,
Experiments in the Legal Control of Sex Expression, 39 YALE L.J. 219, 240-44 (1929)).
70. POSNER, supra note 33, at 60-61. Many colonies adopted the death penalty for adultery,
but it was rarely enforced. D'EMILO & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 28. In the seventeenth cen-
tury, colonists vigorously enforced fornication laws. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 35.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 430. A 1954 survey
indicated that 18 jurisdictions criminalized a single sexual act between unmarried persons, four
only by a fine. In most states only a continuous or "open and notorious" nonmarital relationship
was criminalized. Eleven states did not make fornication a crime and only 30 states criminalized
adultery, four only by a fine. id. at 430-31. For further discussion of the trend away from criminal
law imposing "a uniform standard of personal morals concerning intimate behavior," see William
V. Vetter, I.R.C. § 152(b)(5) and Victorian Morality in Contemporary Life, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 115, 125 (1995) (listing state statutes criminalizing cohabitation, adultery, and fornication, as
well as states with non-discrimination laws). According to FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 128, "In
modern California, fornication is not a crime at all; it has been relabeled and repackaged, and is, if
anything, an esteemed, accepted way of life." Friedman's description reflects the progression of
fornication in my model from crime toward public right.
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 435. The 1880 census
reveals that of 58,000 prisoners in the United States, only 161 were jailed for adultery, and 85 for
fornication. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 140.
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rassment of interracial couples.73 Because of abusive selective enforcement,
and reasoning that "private immorality should be beyond the reach of the
law," the Model Penal Code decriminalized fornication and adultery.7 4 Many
states have retained their fornication and adultery statutes.75 Retention of
these rarely enforced statutes, however, is far outweighed by judicial enforce-
ment of implied contract claims between cohabitants, beginning with Marvin
v. Marvin in 1976.76
Fornication, then, has progressed from criminalization to decriminaliza-
tion, and continues on to contract through enforcement of cohabitation con-
tracts. While some states, such as New Jersey, are extending some traditional
marital benefits to cohabitants, such as claims of emotional distress based on
seeing a loved one injured, the general rule remains that special rights come
only with marriage and cohabitants are not entitled to enjoy those rights.77
5. Cross-Dressing
Cross-dressing was initially criminalized and has progressed toward being
decriminalized. Its criminalization in the United States is a modem form of
English sumptuary laws intended to regulate what clothing a person could
wear based on her social class." The prohibition in its more recent incarna-
tion has been used to enforce gender norms. A number of municipal ordinanc-
es forbid cross-dressing.79 Like other sexual regulations, regulation of cross-
dressing has long been used to harass gay people for failing to dress in gen-
der-appropriate clothing.8" But the ordinances have been held unconstitutional
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fomication. Fornication laws in Min-
nesota and Illinois have also been used as justifications for refusing to enforce an ordinance re-
quiring non-discrimination on the basis of marital status against a landlord who refused to rent to
heterosexual cohabitors, Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), refusing to enforce an im-
plied contract between heterosexual cohabitors, Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (111. 1979), and
for taking custody of children away from a parent in a heterosexual cohabiting relationship, Jarrett
v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979); see also POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 15, at 98-99 (de-
scribing recent cases citing fornication statutes, including civil defamation and medical malpractice
actions).
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 436, 439; see also
Craig T. Pearson, Comment, The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy
Statutes, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 811, 846 (1984) ("It may be shown that the law is discriminatory as
applied, since sodomy statutes are most often enforced against homosexuals."); Note, The Right of
Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws Regulating Private Consensual Behavior, 25 WAYNE L.
REV. 1067, 1070 (1979) (noting that sodomy laws are selectively enforced against gay people);
see also Amicus Curiae Brief Filed by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Louisiana v.
Baxley, 633 So. 2d 142 (La. 1994) (state admits selectively enforcing sodomy statute against gay
people), published in 21 FOPDHAM URB. L.J. 1012, 1046 (1995) (describing selective enforcement
of facially neutral crime against nature statute).
75. Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free" Exercise of Religion: Tenant's
Right to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J 699, 752 (1995)
(noting that fornication is still a crime in approximately one-fourth of the states); see also Vetter,
supra note 71, at 115 nn.2-7 (listing fornication, adultery, cohabitation, and sodomy statutes).
76. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
77. For a discussion of the limited rights cohabitants enjoy in relation to one another, see
infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
78. MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING AND CULTURAL ANXIETY 17
(1992).
79. Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1564 & n.85 (1993).
80. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggrega-
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as applied to transsexuals, individuals in transition from one sex to another."'
However, transsexuals do not enjoy full public rights, as they remain unpro-
tected by Title VII. 2
Cross-dressing seems less likely than homosexuality to play itself out in a
contractual arrangement. Transgendered individuals, however, are as likely to
be employed as gay people, and thus are candidates for protection in contrac-
tual purgatory where employment contracts can protect them from discrimina-
tion on the basis of failure to adhere to gender norms. As Mary Anne Case,
Katherine Franke, and Francisco Valdes have argued, gender discrimination
should be, but often is not, actionable under employment discrimination
law. 3 One would expect contractual pro(ection to fill this gap in statutory
and constitutional employment discrimination law. But, despite the mini-explo-
sion of queer theory that uses cross-dressing as a theoretical tool to
deconstruct gender, 4 transgendered people are rarely protected by non-
discrimination clauses.
6. Summary: The Trend Seems Progressive
The brief historical analysis above suggests that the pattern of develop-
ment for sodomy, abortion, miscegenation, fornication, and cross-dressing
from public condemnation toward public rights (including the move from
criminalization to contract) is progressive. The core of its progressiveness is
that victimless crimes become decriminalized, contractualized, or even public
rights. This is progressive because it reserves the strong arm of the state to
punish crimes with identifiable victims and leaves personal moral judgments to
tion of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 63 n.257 (1995) (describing how butch lesbians
were arrested in the 1950s if they were not wearing at least three pieces of female clothing) (citing
LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS 185 (1991); ELIZABETH L. KENNEDY &
MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SUPPERS OF GOLD 180 (1993); Cain, supra note 79, at
1564 & n.85).
81. Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (cross-dressing ordinance unconstitu-
tional as applied to individuals undergoing therapy for sex-reassignment surgery); City of Chicago
v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (I11. 978) (convictions reversed because "[t]here is no evidence
... that cross-dressing, when done as part of a preoperative therapy program or otherwise, is, in
and of itself, harmful to society"); see Franke, supra note 80, at 66-69 (discussing City of Colum-
bus v. Zanders, No. 74AP-88 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1974) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file);
City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio Mun. CL 1974); City of Columbus v. Rogers,
324 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1975) (illustrating legal investment in maintaining gender differences
through sumptuary laws)).
82. Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that discharge
of male nursery school teacher for wearing earring not violative of Title VII); Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that discharge does not constitute Title VII
sex discrimination when pilot changed from being a man to being a woman). Nor is gender dys-
phoria protected as a disability under Washington law. Doe v. The Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531
(Wash. 1993) (employee's gender dysphoria nota "handicap" under Washington law).
83. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Ef-
feminate Man in the Law of Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (proposing that
gender and sex be disaggregated to protect against gender discrimination); Franke, supra note 80;
Valdes, supra note 2.
84. See, e.g., JuDrrl BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, TROUBLE]; JU-
DITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATrER (1993) [hereinafter BUrLER, BODIES]; Case, supra note 83;
Franke, supra note 80; Valdes, supra note 2; Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic
Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1973 (1995).
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the individuals involved. But other sexual regulations, such as marital rape and
child sexual abuse, move in the opposite direction: the progressive trajectory is
from public right to public condemnation (with contract again being a progres-
sive step).
B. Damnation from Public Rights to Criminalization
The victimless crimes (sodomy, abortion, miscegenation, fornication, and
cross-dressing) tend to move from right to left in my model-from criminali-
zation toward public rights. But other sexual regulations, such as marital rape
and child sexual abuse, move in the opposite direction-from public rights to
criminalization. One way to see moves in both directions as progressive is to
recognize that criminalization of victimless crimes can be justified only by
moral arguments, and personal autonomy trumps contested moral grounds in a
progressive scheme. 5 Victims of marital rape and child sexual abuse, howev-
er, were .virtually invisible legally until the 1970s and 1980s, so the progres-
sive move for this conduct is from a perpetrator's public right to abuse toward
criminalization.
1. Marital Rape
Rape was traditionally defined as non-consensual sexual intercourse, by
force, with a woman other than the defendant's wife. 6 The marital rape
exemption thus conferred on married men the public right to rape87 their
wives with impunity until the exemption was widely repealed in response to
feminist activism. The absolute version of the marital rape exemption no
85. In the 1950s the Wolfenden Report, prepared for the British Parliament as a result of
pressure by the Church of England's Moral Welfare Council, reached a similar conclusion. The
Report recommended that British law retain criminal punishment for public gay sex, and gay sex
with minors, but repeal prohibitions on private consensual same-sex sexual activity between
adults. The Report reasoned, "We do not think that it is proper for the law to concern itself with
what a man does in private unless it can be shown to be so contrary to the public good that the
law ought to intervene in its function as the guardian of that public good." COMMrIrEE ON HOMO-
SEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTIUTON, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 42-43 (1963). The Report fur-
ther reasoned that moral "revulsion" for homosexuality as "unnatural, sinful or disgusting" was
insufficient justification for criminalizing consensual adult gay sex: "Many people feel this revul-
sion .... But moral conviction or instinctive feeling, however strong, is not a valid basis for
overriding the individual's privacy and for bringing within the gambit of the criminal law private
sexual behavior of this kind." Id. at 44.
86. ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 8. Another way to view the movement of marital rape from
public right to crime is through the doctrine of implied consent. Marital rape was not criminalized
until recently because the wife was deemed to have impliedly consented to all sexual relations
with her husband when they exchanged vows. See, e.g., Louisiana v, Haines, 51 La 731, 732
(1899) ("[T]he husband of a woman cannot himself be guilty of an actual rape upon his wife, on
account of the matrimonial consent which she has given, and which she cannot retract."). Fem-
inists, however, have successfully argued that the marriage vow is not a blanket consent. This
changed perception of marriage vows enabled a wife to claim her husband raped her because on
that particular instance she refused sexual relations. So the progressive move in marital rape law is
to reinstate lack of consent as an element of the offense, rather than imply consent from the
victim's status as wife.
87. For a discussion of the marital rape exemption under Hohfeld, see supra note 16. I be-
lieve the exemption is a privilege for the husband and no-right for the wife, while removing the
exemption creates a right on the part of the wife and a duty on the part of the husband.
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longer exists,8 but many of the reformed statutes retain lower punishments
for marital rape. Moreover, some states have added cohabitants and former
spouses to the group of men benefitting from the remains of the marital
exemption."' Given the difficulty of proving lack of consent when the defen-
dant is the victim's spouse, 90 the current state of marital rape law seems to
fall somewhere between public condemnation and contract.9' In sum, marital
rape has progressed from being a public right to somewhere between contract
and public condemnation.
2. Child Sexual Abuse
Sexual intercourse with children has long been criminal, but only expan-
sion of the offense to include other sexual contact and evidentiary reforms
have made prosecutions feasible in many cases.9 2 At common law, child sex-
88. By 1990, no state had an absolute marital rape exemption, but 35 states had special re-
quirements in marital rape prosecutions, such as aggravated force or non-cohabitation. By 1991,
25 states had limitations on offenders, and by 1994, 24 states abolished any form of marital rape
exemption. However, at least 13 states continue to give preferential treatment to spousal defen-
dants. Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon? Demythologizing Spousal Rape and
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 682 (1996); see also BECKER Er AL.,
supra note 48, at 241 (citing Helaine Olen, The Law: Most States Now Ban Marital Rape, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at 7) (describing how by 1991 every state except North Carolina and Okla-
homa had repealed their marital rape exemptions).
89. BECKER ET AL., supra note 48, at 241.
90. Id. at 242. Professors Becker, Bowman, and Torrey describe problems in obtaining a
conviction in one of the first marital rape cases under South Carolina law. A husband
fd]ragged [his wife] by the throat into a bedroom, tied her hands and legs with rope and
a belt, put duct tape on her eyes and mouth, and dressed her in stockings and a garter
belt. He then had intercourse with her, sexually assaulted her with foreign objects, and
threatened her with a knife. ... The jury saw this transpire because the husband had
made a 30 minute video tape of the event ....
Id. at 241-42.
The jury acquitted, apparently believing the husband's defense that the sex was consensual.
The judge permitted the wife's former husband to testify that she allowed him to tie her up and
enjoyed violent sex, but excluded testimony from the husband's former wife establishing that he
assaulted and raped her, too. Additional facts which the jury apparently disregarded included the
fact that the couple had agreed to separate the night before and the husband "did not untie his
wife when he left the house so she had to struggle to get loose before she ran naked to a
neighbor's house for help." Id.
91. If marital rape were to explicitly stop at contract, it might take the form of evidentiary
issues related to contract. Perhaps a husband would need evidence of consent in written form, akin
to the statute of frauds.
92. See Karla-Dee Clark, Note, Innocent Victims and Blind Justice: Children's Rights to Be
Free from Child Sexual Abuse, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 214, 223 (1990). The prior lack of
emphasis on child sexual abuse stemmed from the historical view that children were considered
proprietary interests. JEFFREY J. HAUGAARD & N. DICKON REPPUCCI, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN 1 (1988). According to the Roman law concept of patria potestas, the father had abso-
lute power over his children. Id. Though the Judeo-Christian tradition did not condone child sexu-
al abuse, it endorsed the idea that parents had possessory rights over their children. MARY
DEYOUNG, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF CHILDREN 103 (1982). For example, according to
Talmudic law, sexual intercourse with a girl over three years old was not a crime as long as the
child's father consented. Id. The American colonial tradition inherited the notion that the father
was legally entitled to control the family. Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part 1:
Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 300 (1972).
This principle was weakly tempered by the Roman law concept of parens patriae, which allowed
the State to assert the fights of children who were incapable of asserting their own rights.
HAUGAARD & REPPUCCI, supra, at 2. However, the State's right to intervene in the family had to
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ual abuse by strangers fell into three offenses: seduction, statutory rape, and
sodomy.93 Until the late nineteenth century, statutory rape law only protected
girls under ten years of age.94 But many instances of child sexual abuse went
unreported and unprosecuted both because of limited notions of sexual abuse
and the mistaken belief that child sexual abuse was an exclusively extra-
familial occurrence.
95
Incest was not criminalized at common law, leaving enforcement of the
social prohibition to ecclesiastical courts." Some colonial statutes outlawed
incest,97 but many states did not pass anti-incest statutes until the mid-nine-
teenth century. 9s Even these statutes, however, were not calculated to protect
victims of incest. Instead, their main purposes were to prevent inbreeding and
uphold the legitimate exercise of patriarchal authority within the family.99 To
be balanced against family sanctity and the right of privacy. Id.
93. The Model Penal Code commentary on sexual assault points out that "[tihe common law
made no special provision for indecent sexual contact but covered such conduct as a form of as-
sault and battery." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 commentary at 398; JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1159-1164, at 1088 (describing carnal knowledge of a consent-
ing girl between 10 and 12 as a common law misdemeanor and of a girl under 10 "probably" a
felony), and §§ 1172-1174 (describing how both a boy and a man could be indicted for sodomy
under common law) (4th ed. 1868).
94. Jane E. Larson, Even a Worm Will Turn at Last: Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth Cen-
tury America, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN -, 3. (forthcoming 1996-97) (citing 75 C.J.S. Rape § 13
(1952)) (draft on file with the author). Contemporary rape statutes remain underenforced. Michelle
Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 N.W. J.L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1994).
95. Clark, supra note 92, at 222-23. But some colonies criminalized incest, an offense that
included consensual sex and marriage between relatives; the colony of New Haven made incest a
capital offense, but the Massachusetts Bay Colony did noL ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRAN-
NY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 24-25 (1987).
96. Peter Bardaglio, An Outrage upon Nature: Incest and the Law in the Nineteenth-Century
South, in IN JOY AND SORROW: WOMEN FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN THE VICTORIAN SOUTH,
1830-1900, at 32, 34 (Carol Bleser ed., 1991) (stating that "common law ... traditionally did not
recognize incest as a crime and left its regulation to church authorities" and referring to the "new
anti-incest statutes" in the nineteenth century South). Ecclesiastical courts could annul consanguin-
eous marriages, excommunicate the parties, and declare offspring illegitimate. Id. at 35.
97. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 18; PLECK, supra note 95, at 24-25 ("The
Bible called for capital punishment for those who committed incest, but the English law did not.
The Colony of New Haven followed the Bible and made incest a capital offense; the Colony of
Massachusetts Bay copied English law.").
98. Bardaglio, supra note 96, at 39 ("By the mid-nineteenth century, most Southern states
had laws on the books making incest either a felony or high misdemeanor."); see also Laura F.
Edwards, 'If I Had Not Been As Strong As I Am': African-American and Poor White Women's
Legal Claims in Post-Emancipation North Carolina 8 (presented at Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Society for Legal History, Richmond, Virginia, Oct. 1996) (describing how North Carolina did
not criminalize incest until 1879) (copy on file with the author).
99. Bardaglio, supra note 96, at 39 ("The main objective in the anti-incest legislation was to
prohibit matrimony and inbreeding between near kin, not to protect women or children from sexu-
al abuse."). Bardaglio notes:
In general, the impact of incestuous assault on women and children was only a second-
ary consideration, if that, in antebellum decisions. Sexual abuse appeared to disturb
Southern judges primarily because it undermined the family as an effective institution of
social control. More specifically, sexual abuse exposed the coercion that underlay the




serve these purposes, early incest laws only punished intercourse' °° Southern
judges reinforced the narrowly drafted statutes by strictly construing them and
punishing only those defendants who used physical force to assault their rela-
tives.' A consenting victim was treated as an accomplice, which Peter
Bardaglio has described as "a legal fiction that allowed judges to express their
disapproval of incest while restricting convictions for the crime mainly to
those indisputable instances of assault which exposed the coercion inherent in
the exercise of patriarchal authority and which thus called into question its
legitimacy."'' 2 Thus, men generally had a public right to considerable sexual
access to children in their families until the late nineteenth century, and even
then protecting the child victims was not the motivation behind criminal prohi-
bitions of incest.
By the early nineteenth century, state statutes began in earnest to
criminalize child sexual abuse, but prosecution remained difficult due to evi-
dentiary problems related to the victim's testimony and statutes of limita-
tions."' Consequently, reform legislation beginning in the early 1980s fo-
cused on altering evidentiary rules to facilitate child sexual abuse prosecu-
tions."' While child sexual abuse now seems to fall squarely in the public
100. Id. at 39.
101. Id. at 49 (explaining that Southern judges often required physical force to convict but
Northern judges were more willing to recognize psychological coercion).
102. Id. at 51 (concluding that "[diespite the judicial rhetoric of outrage, then, the reality was
that during the nineteenth century, the sexual access of men to women and children in their family
remained largely unchallenged").
103. Timothy J. McCarvill & James M. Steinberg, Note, Have We Gone Far Enough? Chil-
dren Who Are Sexually Abused and the Judicial and Legislative Means of Prosecuting the Abuser,
8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 339, 339 (1992). Often a child will not or cannot testify against
the alleged perpetrator. See Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 806-07 (1985) [hereinafter Legislative Innova-
tions] (describing how children are often incompetent to testify, unable to recall specific events,
and may be frightened by the courtroom experience).
104. Legislative Innovations, supra note 103, at 808-09, 811, 813; see also Josephine Bulkley,
Introduction: Background and Overview of Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 5, 7 (1985)
(describing how, in 1982, only Kansas and Washington had statutory hearsay exceptions dealing
with child-victim testimony and how in 1981, only four states' statutes allowed videotaped testi-
mony in child sexual abuse cases). Other legislative reform allowed expert testimony, physical
separation of the victim and the accused in the courtroom, and extension of statutes of limitations
for civil and criminal prosecution of child sexual abuse. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE OF LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES (1985) (discussing emerging legal issues, trends, and recent reforms in the area of
child sexual abuse). The current focus on child sexual abuse has expanded to the international
arena, addressing such issues as the sex tourism trade involving children. See, e.g., Patricia D.
Levan, Note & Comment, Curtailing Thailand's Child Prostitution Through an International Con-
science, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L, & POL'Y 869 (1994). In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988), which funded programs to prevent and
treat child abuse. Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Note, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the
Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV.
175, 178-79 (1991). To be eligible for funding, the statute required states to pass mandatory re-
porting laws dealing with child abuse. JESSE A. GOLDNER, CHILD ABUSE NEGLECT AND THE LAW
39 n.3 (1979). In 1976, the Child Abuse and Neglect Project of the States' Education Commission
proposed model legislation conforming to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. Howev-
er, the model legislation left to state courts and legislatures the task of defining sexual abuse. Id.
at 47. In 1986, Congress criminalized sexual abuse of children by enacting the Sexual Abuse Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1986).
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condemnation category, its regulation is not uncontroversial. Accused perpetra-
tors have successfully sued therapists who have testified on behalf of victims,
claiming that the therapists planted abuse memories in the accusers'
minds."' And while commentators argue persuasively that such liability is
contrary to the interests of all but the perpetrator,"° other commentators
question whether the evidentiary changes improperly preference the victim's
interest over the accused's constitutional rights. 7
In sum, child sexual abuse follows a similar trajectory as that of marital
rape. While sexual intercourse with children has been criminalized since the
colonial era, the criminalization left many children unprotected from assault,
so that only recent understandings of child sexual abuse and amendments to
evidentiary rules have facilitated serious prosecutions."°a This brief history
suggests that, like marital rape, child sexual abuse has gone from left to right
in the diagram, directly from a public right to public condemnation. The rea-
son this trajectory is progressive is that, as with marital rape, children who
were previously invisible as victims of sexual abuse are now legally recog-
nized as victims.
3. Summary: The Trend Also Seems Progressive
The trend from public rights toward criminalization seems progressive in
the cases of marital rape and child sexual abuse. Fornication, for example,
seems to harm only society generally (if anyone), and therefore is a victimless
crime. Thus it has moved from right to left on the diagram, as legal mecha-
nisms have begun to favor individual autonomy over collective morality. But
child sexual abuse has moved from left to right in the diagram, because recent
expansion of the definition of sexual abuse and evidentiary reforms made the
(female and child) victims legally visible.
Political progressives see both directions as appropriate, because both
increase protection for persons who need it: sexual marginorities and children.
Heterosexual women and children need protection from abuse by family mem-
bers, while sexual marginorities need protection from state imposition of a
majoritarian morality. Political conservatives, however, would likely prefer a
movement in the opposite direction, toward public regulation of morality and
state enforcement of paternal rights in the traditional family."° While my
105. Cynthia G. Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in
Sexual-Abuse and Survivor Therapy, 109 HARv. L. REV. 549 (1996).
106. Id. at 551.
107. See, e.g., Danielle Goblirsch, Balancing the Rights of Child Sexual Abuse Victims as
Witnesses and the Constitutional Rights of Defendants: Has the Iowa Legislature Gone Too Far to
Protect the Child Victim?, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 227 (1993).
108. Social recognition that children are sexually abused in significant numbers had to predate
the evidentiary accommodation. In 1953 Kinsey found that one out of four girls and one out of
ten boys were sexually assaulted before the age of eighteen. See CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY &
KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 32 (1990). Both the Civil Rights and women's move-
ments of the 1950s and 1960s contributed to the social and political climate that led to prosecu-
tions of child sexual abuse. Id. at 33. The deliberate speed with which American culture recog-
nized child abuse is reflected by the fact that the ASPCA was formed shortly before the American
Society for the Prevention Cruelty to Children. Thomas, supra note 92, at 307-08 (describing how
the ASPCA formed eight years before the ASPCC).
109. Colorado recently considered the Parental Rights Amendment, a ballot initiative which
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model is descriptive, it also reflects a normative judgement that personal
autonomy should trump majoritarian morality where there is no identifiable
victim.
IV. QUEER NATION: THE MODEL AS APPLIED TO GAY PEOPLE
Having set out the model as it applies to various sexual regulations, I now
apply it to one area in some detail. The way the law regulates gay people
nicely illustrates how one group can be at multiple places in my model, but
generally closer to contractual purgatory than the public extremes (condemna-
tion and rights).
A. Crimes of Passion: Public Condemnation of Homosexuality
Almost half of the states criminalize sodomy. And as a result of Bowers
v. Hardwick, there is nothing unconstitutional about criminalizing the conduct
of gay people, while refusing to criminalize the same conduct when performed
by heterosexual sex partners."0 In the military, gay service members are sub-
ject to court martial and imprisonment for identifying themselves as gay.'"
Moreover, facially neutral criminal statutes against fornication, vagrancy, and
public indecency are often enforced against gay people."' In addition, city
ordinances that criminalize cross-dressing have long been applied to harass
and prosecute gay people." 3
While the legitimacy of criminalizing homosexuality is hotly contest-
ed," 4 and criminal sodomy statutes are rarely enforced to punish consensual
would have effectively exchanged at least parts of children's public right to be free from child
abuse for parents' public rights to discipline their children as they saw fit. The proposed Amend-
ment provided: "All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which
may be reckoned the right of ... parents to direct and control the upbringing, education, values,
and discipline of their children." Michelle D. Johnston, Hidden Agenda in Amend. 17?, DENY.
POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at Al. The constitutional amendment, however, did not pass. Michelle D.
Johnston, Of the People Faces Hearing on Election Law, DENy. POST, Nov. 14, 1996, at B I (not-
ing that proposed amendment was defeated, 58% to 42%).
110. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986).
111. RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW 93 (1992) (describing an investigation of women
Marines suspected of lesbianism at Parris Island in 1986 through 1988, which involved question-
ing almost half of the 246 women at the training facility, discharging 27 women, and penalizing 3
women with prison sentences, forfeitures, reductions in rank, and dishonorable discharges).
112. See, e.g., People v. Hale, 168 N.E.2d 518 (N.Y. 1960) (vagrancy law applies equally to
"loitering pimps and prostitutes... and loitering homosexuals"); Shannon Minter, Note, Sodomy
and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S. Immigration Law Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity,
26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 771, 772 (1993).
113, See, e.g., People v. Gillespi, 204 N.E.2d 211 (N.Y. 1964) (defendants convicted under
vagrancy statute for cross-dressing); People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (App. Div. 1968),
affd, 260 N.E.2d 871 (1970) (male youth convicted of vagrancy for dressing as female in subway
station). Both vagrancy and cross-dressing statutes have often been used to harass gay people.
GARBER, supra note 78, at 32; KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 80, at 180 & n.29 (relating that
Buffalo, New York police in the 1950s arrested and threatened to arrest lesbians socializing in
bars or on the street if the women had on less than three pieces of women's clothing).
114. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 81-84
(1991); Thomas Coleman, Jr., Disordered Liberty: Judicial Restrictions on the Rights to Privacy
and Equality in Bowers v. Hardwick and Baker v. Wade, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1986)
David 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 CONTENTS 215 (1986-87);
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adult conduct, the fact that gay conduct remains criminal in so much of the
country has tremendous significance for the legal life of gay people. Gay par-
ents have lost custody of their children, and qualified people have been ex-
cluded from military service or employment, at least in part due to sodomy
laws." 5 Moreover, the symbolic power of criminalizing gay conduct serves
to quell arguments for contractual or public rights to employment or housing
opportunities, marriage, or political participation.
The pervasive effects of Bowers v. Hardwick are further evidenced in
Justice Scalia's assertion in his dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans: "If it is
constitutionally permissible for a state to make homosexual conduct criminal,
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a state to enact other laws merely
disfavoring homosexual conduct."" 6 While Justice Scalia's opinion did not
prevail, and the Court struck down Amendment 2 as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause,"7 his blustery dissent illustrates one danger of sodomy
laws: the existence of sodomy laws somewhere might justify any discriminato-
ry treatment of gay people anywhere, as long as the actions were leveled at
gay people as gay people." 8 Had Scalia's argument persuaded a majority of
the Court, Amendment 2 would have had a staggering legal effect.
Under Scalia's reasoning, not only would Amendment 2 arguably have
prevented Colorado state courts from recognizing a claim (even a purely pri-
Goldstein, supra note 45; Janet Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy
and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (1986); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 747-70 (1989); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by
Personal Predilection, 54 U. C. L. REV. 648 (1987); Mitchell L. Peart, Note, Chipping Away at
Bowers v. Hardwick: Making the Best of an Unfortunate Decision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154 (1988);
Yvonne Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Legitimization of Homophobia in Ameri-
ca, 30 How. L.J. 537 (1987); Joseph R. Thornton, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: An Incomplete
Constitutional Analysis, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1100 (1987).
115. Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 84, at 1985-86 (describing how sodomy
laws contribute to gay parents losing custody of their children, gay employees losing their jobs,
and foreclose strict scrutiny under equal protection doctrine). It must be remembered, however,
that actual enforcement of sodomy laws waxes and wanes. In Chicago in 1908, for example, po-
lice made 73 felony arrests for the "crime against nature," while in 1909 they made only 31 such
arrests. Similarly, the number of appellate cases on same-sex sexuality increased between 1870
and 1900, and continued to increase in the fast half of the twentieth century. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 32, at 344.
116. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1630 (1996) (Scalia, I., dissenting); see also Lyle
Denniston, Scalia Takes Charge in Gay Rights Case, AM. LAW., Dec. 1995, at 106 (describing
how Justice Scalia "worked so hard to argue [Colorado Assistant Attorney General Timothy
Tymkovich's] case for him that the lawyer nearly became a bystander. Scalia then argued that
since Bowers has upheld the criminalizing of homosexual conduct, then states surely could take
action short of that, as Colorado had done in 'denying special protection' for the same kind of
conduct") Id. at 107.
117. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
118. Scalia's reasoning, of course, does not interpret Amendment 2 to prevent granting an
African-American gay person protection from racial discrimination. But Scalia's interpretation
would prevent African-American gay people from seeking protection from discrimination as gay
people. In other words, if a police officer refused to assist a gay African-American man, saying,
"No way, I hate gays," that would be permissible conduct under Scalia's reading of Amendment
2, whereas it would not be permissible for the same police officer to refuse help, saying, "No way.
I hate Blacks." But the fact remains that Amendment 2 singles out one class of citizens for special
second-class status. The tremendous impact of Amendment 2 was the targeting of this characteris-
tic as one that is not a basis for protection.
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vate contractual one)" 9 of discrimination brought by a gay person, but even
more oppressive regulations would have been justified. Thus Romer v. Evans
is a landmark case not only for constitutional jurisprudence, but also for doc-
umenting gay people's progress from public condemnation toward public
rights. While Evans did not overrule Bowers v. Hardwick,' it may be inter-
preted to mandate that gay people have access to a level playing field as they
seek public rights. As such, Evans is a tentative move in the direction of gay
public rights, and further protects gay presence in the contractual way station.
B. Contracts: Where Like Minds Meet
Despite widespread criminalization, gay people enjoy private, contract-
based protection of their relationships with lovers and employers. Ruthann
Robson divides gay relationship contracts into three categories: (1) estate plan-
ning tools such as wills, trusts, and powers of attorney; (2) cohabitation con-
tracts; and (3) quasi-marriage contracts through domestic partnership legisla-
tion. 2 1 I focus on the second category-cohabitation contracts-and briefly
address employment contracts which protect against sexual orientation discrim-
ination. While only a small corner of the universe of gay-related contracts,
these two examples address some variety of gay-positive contracting in that
they cover voluntary exchanges for both love and money.
1. Contracts for Love: Cohabitation
Cohabitation contracts between same-sex partners tend to be enforced
where the parties structure their agreement like a business arrangement. They
are less likely to be enforced, however, when they mirror traditional marriage.
119. An example of a purely private contract would be an employment contract with non-
discrimination or domestic partnership policies. While this contract seems enforceable under
Amendment 2, a court could conceivably refuse to enforce it (or a gay cohabitation contract) by
seeing recognition of the contract as enforcement as a "policy whereby homosexual ... orienta-
tion ... entitlles] [a] person... to claim ... protected status or... discrimination," as forbidden
by Amendment 2. The full text of Amendment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orien-
tation, conduct, practices, or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota prefer-
ences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall
be in all respects self-executing.
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996); Sue Chrisman, Commentary, Evans v. Romer: An
"Old" Right Comes Out, 72 DENy. U. L. REv. 519 (1995).
Thus, a broad interpretation of Amendment 2 might have forbidden Colorado Courts from
enforcing private contracts not to discriminate on the basis of gay sexual orientation. If so, my
contract arguments would have been eviscerated in Colorado, since no court could have enforced
gay cohabitation or employment contracts that bar sexual orientation discrimination.
120. The majority opinion does not cite Bowers, which is one of only two or three gay rights
cases ever heard by the United States Supreme Court.
121. Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbi-
an Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 511, 520 (1990). Arguably, the municipal nature of a domes-
tic partnership ordinance makes contracts arising from it more like public right than a purely pri-
vate transaction.
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An Ohio court, for example, refused to award any remedy regarding assets
accumulated over nine years by a lesbian couple, reasoning that one partner's
belief that the relationship resembled a marriage was insufficient reason for
recovery.'22 Similarly, the California Court of Appeals refused to enforce an
implied cohabitation agreement between two men where the plaintiff referred
to himself as having been the other man's lover, reasoning that the meretri-
cious elements of the contract could not be severed from its business as-
pects.
123
But courts are more likely to enforce implied contracts couched in busi-
ness terms.2 4 A California court enforced an oral cohabitation contract be-
tween two men despite sexual elements to the contract because there were also
business elements. The court explained its reason for awarding damages only
for the business-related services:
[Wihere services provided by the complaining homosexual partner
were limited to "lover, companion, homemaker, travelling companion,
housekeeper and cook" . . . plaintiff's rendition of sex and other ser-
vices naturally flowing from sexual cohabitation was an inseparable
part of the consideration for the so-called cohabitation agreement .
... In contrast, [plaintiff here] ... itemizes services contracted for as
companion, chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, partner, and business
counsellor. These, except for companion, are significantly different
from those household duties normally attendant to non-business co-
habitation and are those for which monetary compensation ordinarily
would be anticipated.'25
This language suggests that the best way to maximize the likelihood of judicial
enforcement of gay couples' cohabitation contracts is to expressly formulate
them as business agreements, omitting any mention of the parties' relation-
122. Seward v. Mentrup, 622 N.E.2d 756, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) ("lAppellee never
promised... that appellant would be reimbursed for improvements to appellee's residence. Ap-
pellant assumed that she would be entitled to a division of the improvements' value simply be-
cause she viewed the parties' relationship as similar to a marriage.... In the absence of a mar-
riage contract or other agreement, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to appellee
on appellant's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims.").
123. Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding there was no severable
portion of a gay cohabitation contract supported by independent consideration).
124. See, e.g., Bramkett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1980) (imposing constructive trust
based on lesbian couple's oral cohabitation agreement); Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901, 904 (Ga.
1979) (imposing implied trust regarding assets of gay male couple because "the evidence was
inconclusive as to the exact nature of the relationship"); Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982) (reversing summary judgment so plaintiff could pursue partnership claims regarding
lesbian relationship).
125. Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 410 (Ct. App. 1988) (distinguishing Jones v.
Daly). But artist Robert Rauschenberg's former lover and business partner was allowed to pursue
his oral contractual claim after their 22-year relationship ended, and the court held it irrelevant
whether the services were personal or commercial, as long as they were not exclusively sexual.
Van Brunt v. Rauschenberg, 799 F. Supp. 1467, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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ship,12 6 since courts have shown more willingness to enforce contracts aris-
ing out of a love affair if it is structured like a business affair.
a. Express Cohabitation Contracts
The cases above involve claims arising out of implied rather than express
contracts. Many gay couples have entered written cohabitation contracts, and
courts have occasionally enforced them. Even in Georgia, which enforces its
sodomy law more aggressively than most states, 2 7 a same-sex cohabitation
contract has been enforced.' Enforcement, however, is less than a contrac-
tual slam dunk for gay people. Like implied cohabitation contracts, express
cohabitation contracts are more likely to be enforced if they are structured like
a business relationship and are silent about the love relationship.
In Crooke v. Gilden, the Georgia Supreme Court enforced a lesbian co-
habitation contract over one partner's objections that the contract should not be
enforced because it was based on "immoral or illegal" consideration. 29 The
court excluded evidence of the partners' lesbian relationship, reasoning that the
parol evidence rule barred admission of evidence varying an integrated
contract.3 Crooke thus reveals contractual purgatory as a place where many
gay people can take refuge only if they go there in disguise. "' Only if the
partners' agreement does not reference their romantic relationship--as long as
they are willing to be closeted-will it be enforced as a contract.3 2 But con-
tractual purgatory is perhaps a haven where the alternative is damnation to
criminalization, or no recovery at all.
126. See Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (enforcing contractual agreement be-
tween former lovers and excluding all evidence of the nature of the relationship through the parol
evidence rule); see also HAYDEN CURRY & DENIS CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND
GAY COUPLES 2:1 (5th ed. 1989) ("[I]f a contract states (or even implies) that a promise was
made in exchange for sexual services, the contract won't be enforced. So don't make any
references to sexuality; identify yourselves as 'partners,' not 'lovers.' The less cute you are the
better.").
127. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir.
1995) (relying on sodomy statute to fire assistant attorney general for celebrating Jewish marriage
ceremony with same-sex partner).
128. Crooke, 414 S.E.2d at 645. I would likely not have found this case had Mary Becker not
called my attention to it. Because it does not mention the parties' relationship or discuss the con-
tract as a cohabitation contract, it likely would be buried in generic contract key numbers. The
Georgia Supreme Court masqueraded a gay cohabitation contract as an ordinary commercial con-
tract in order to enforce it, but in doing so the court also obscured the value of the case as prece-
dent by making it difficult to find and thus difficult to cite in subsequent cases.
129. Id.
130. The cohabitation contract at issue included an integration clause: "This Agreement sets
forth the entire agreement between the partners with regard to the subject matter hereof." Id. at
646.
131. The partner opposing enforcement, of course, did not want to benefit from contractual
purgatory, in that she resisted judicial enforcement of the contract. She did perhaps benefit from
the relationship if it was enhanced by the agreement reached in the cohabitation contract, or she
may have benefitted as a gay person but not as an individual property holder.
132. This concern about enforcing contracts based on meretricious consideration underlies
even Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), the landmark case recognizing cohabitation
contract claims. Contract enforcement, then, does not necessarily benefit gay people generally
because it demands closetedness.
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Moreover, the court in Crooke may have ignored the nature of the parties'
relationship merely as a matter of formalism. If in fact everyone knew that
Crooke and Gilden had been lovers and that the contract arose out of that
relationship, then perhaps the court's legal blinders in the name of formalism
are not entirely destructive to a gay rights agenda. Viewed as such, gay cohab-
itation cases may be essential to gay rights litigation, in that the major battle-
front of gay people's lives is achieving legal recognition of their relationships.
But the power of self-identification as gay is absolutely central to virtually
every effort to obtain legal protection for gay people. For example, President
Clinton's compromise "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" exclusion of gay people in the
military was received as being as equally oppressive as the old blanket exclu-
sion. In other words, most gay people deem it less than full recovery when
they can enjoy a benefit only if they remain silent about the fact that they are
gay.
Even this modest victory, however, may be vitiated by practical consider-
ations. The importance of a contractual way station is questionable if almost
nobody stops there. Like heterosexuals, most gay couples cohabit without any
explicit statement of their intentions regarding financial arrangements upon
dissolution. This is why we have default marriage rules: most people do not
bother to contract at all, let alone contract around the default. But maybe even
rarely used cohabitation contracts benefit gay people. First, they are better than
nothing, because they create the possibility of legal recognition. Second, if
some couples are contracting and courts are enforcing the contracts, perhaps
more couples will enter contracts in order to avoid inefficient ex post disputes.
The fact that few gay couples explicitly contract or bring claims based on
contract shows one useful aspect of contractual purgatory: just as society may
get used to gay couples by increased exposure through courts enforcing gay
cohabitation contracts, gay people themselves might increasingly claim the
social space of couplehood if more couples entered contracts and courts en-
forced those contracts. These acclimations may in turn lead society to grant
gay people public rights.
In sum, cohabitation contracts provide some protection and recognition for
relationships that would otherwise be socially and legally invisible. Perhaps
this contractual purgatory is a way station that precedes recognition of gay
marriage as a public right.3 The modest claims of contractual purgatory
(given the low numbers of people that expressly contract) may be bolstered if
implied contracts are added to the machinery that delivers gay people to con-
tractual purgatory. But whereas Crooke was based on legal formalities of the
parol evidence rule, implied contracts do not rest on classical formalism.
133. Perhaps the public right of marriage will be made more contractual. Jeffrey Stake has
argued that privatization arguments are so strong that they suggest substituting mandatory prenup-
tial agreements for the state-mandated marriage contract. Jeffrey E. Stake, Mandatory Planning for
Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397 (1992). Epstein and other proponents of New Private Law would
also likely prefer that parties be held to terms they actually negotiated and agreed to, rather than
default rules supplied by the state. As Katherine Franke pointed out to me, marriage may not be a
progressive step for gay people. Thus perhaps contract is more progressive than marriage for both
gay and heterosexual partners.
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b. Implied Cohabitation Contracts
Courts have recognized implied cohabitation contracts for at least twenty
years.'34 Contracts can be implied-in-fact or implied-in-law. An implied-in-
fact contract is similar to an express contract in that the parties intended to
reach an enforceable agreement but failed to expressly say so.' Contracts
implied-in-law, however, do not require the classical contractual meeting of
the minds. While implied-in-fact contracts are justified by contractual consent,
implied-in-law contracts are justified to prevent unjust enrichment.'36
If contractual purgatory is run by classical contractarians rather than Legal
Realists, only the implied-in-fact cohabitation contract delivers travelers to the
way station. Generally, while classical contract theory does not always require
that contracts be written to be enforceable, they must still be grounded in
mutual intent of the parties to contract. Implied-in-law contracts, however, do
not require mutual assent, and thus seem to breach Epstein's simple rule of
voluntary exchange.'37 Of course, tort-like theories of unjust enrichment
might masquerade as contract. But if entry to contractual purgatory requires
classical contract identity papers, quasi-contracts might not earn one admit-
tance.
If contractual purgatory only embraces implied-in-fact contracts, then
perhaps few people will enter it, resulting in a limited legal effect of the way
station. Like heterosexuals, most gay couples succumb to the power of inertia
and rely on good faith and continuity rather than negotiate express promises
for property distribution in the event that they break up. As a result, contracts
implied-in-law might be the most common claims of partners seeking judicial
remedies. Claimants could mitigate this effect, however, by producing evi-
dence of a contract even absent express agreement. Some companies, universi-
ties, and municipalities accord insurance and other benefits for employees'
domestic partners.'38 Because the forms the domestic partners fill out aver
that the partners cohabit, share finances and support, and intend to do so
indefinitely, the domestic partnership benefit application form may itself be-
come the grounds for an implied contract.'39 Because the partner signing the
134. The landmark implied cohabitation contract case is Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106
(Cal. 1976).
135. See, e.g., ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18, at 41 & n.42 (1963). Carol
S. Bruch presented a paper comparing judicial enforcement of heterosexual and gay implied co-
habitation contracts at the Joint Session of the Contracts and Gay and Lesbian Issues Sections,
AALS, San Antonio, Tex., Jan. 5, 1996. She concluded that courts are equally reluctant to enforce
same-sex and opposite-sex implied cohabitation contract claims. The paper is not published.
136. Id.
137. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53.
138. At the 1996 AALS Joint Session of the Contracts and Gay and Lesbian Issues Sections
in San Antonio, Tex., San Francisco practitioner Paul Wotman described a number of his implied
cohabitation contract cases, and many of his clients fell into the implied-in-law category. Wotman
suggested using domestic partnership forms as evidence of a cohabitation contract.
139. Domestic partnership eligibility often resembles that for heterosexual marriage. Usually
the parties must be eighteen, capable of contractual consent, not closely related, and not in a mar-
riage or domestic partnership already. They also frequently require the partners to state that they
are in a committed relationship and share basic living expenses. Berkeley requires the partners to
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form is likely a wage earner, and thus likely economically independent, the
domestic partnership form may provide a non-wage earning partner evidence
necessary to sustain an implied-in-fact contract claim."4 Thus, more gay
people may enter contractual purgatory even if a cursory glance at their situa-
tion suggests that they do not have any contract claim. As social rituals such
as applying for domestic partnership benefits embrace gay people, legal evi-
dence accumulates. This evidence may well create a contract even where the
parties did not precisely agree on the nature of the agreement. If implied con-
tracts continue to gain recognition, gay people will move more firmly into
contractual purgatory, and thus further toward public rights.
2. Contracts for Money: Employment
Having discussed contracts for love, I now turn to contracts for money.
The most common gay-oriented contract for money is an employer or univer-
sity's contractual protection against sexual orientation discrimination and/or
provision of domestic partnership benefits.
Domestic partnership and non-discrimination contractual protections arise
in universities and other workplaces. The employer or educational institution
agrees not to discriminate against gay people in employment or education,
and/or agrees to extend benefits enjoyed by employees' or students' heterosex-
ual partners to same-sex partners. 4 '
The University of Denver, for example, recently established domestic
partnership benefits, three years after it adopted a non-discrimination policy.
As with other contractual protections, the fate of this purely private contractual
benefit turned on the validity of Amendment 2. If Amendment 2 had become
law, it would have foreclosed any state entity in Colorado enacting or enforc-
ing any ordinance, regulation, statute, or policy that protected against discrimi-
nation on the basis of homosexuality. 42 Thus while private contractual rights
state their intention to remain in the partnership indefinitely. Minneapolis requires that partners
state they are "committed to one another to the same extent as married persons are to each other."
Note, Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analy-
sis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1192-94 (1992).
140. If the Statute of Frauds applies, it requires a writing signed by the person against whom
the contract will be enforced. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 134-135; JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 19-31 (3d ed. 1987).
141. The Association of American Law Schools, for example, requires accredited law schools
not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Since membership in the AALS is voluntary,
this rule is more akin to a contract than a regulation or statute. As such, it fits squarely into con-
tractual purgatory in my model. See Roberto L. Corrada, Of Heterosexism, National Security, and
Federal Preemption: Addressing the Legal Obstacles to a Free Debate About Military Recruitment
at Our Nation's Law Schools, 29 HOUSTON L. REV. 301 (1992).
142. For the text of Amendment 2, see supra note 119. Amendment 2 does not prohibit het-
erosexuals from seeking a remedy from discrimination on the basis of heterosexual orientation.
Denver, Boulder, and Telluride have ordinances that forbid discrimination on the basis of "sexual
orientation." Thus, if it had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, Amendment 2
would have prevented existing ordinances in Denver, Boulder, and Telluride from being enforced
to deter anti-gay discrimination, but would have allowed them to be enforced to deter anti-het-
erosexual discrimination. Thus, under Amendment 2, the sole use of the ordinances would be to
allow people with power (heterosexuals) to harass gay people, the very people intended to be pro-
tected by the ordinances.
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would have been literally all that gay people could have relied on in Colorado
when they were treated unfairly based on their sexual orientation, 43 courts
might have interpreted Amendment 2 broadly to prohibit state courts from en-
forcing even these entirely private contracts according protections against sex-
ual orientation discrimination or granting domestic partnership benefits. Thus,
some forms of public condemnation can foreclose contractual purgatory as an
option.
At least one court has enforced a sexual orientation non-discrimination
clause.'" In Tumeo v. University of Alaska, a university refused to extend
health benefits to employees' same-sex partners, despite a university policy not
to discriminate on the basis of marital status.'45 While the actual holding of
Tumeo may be based on a state statute prohibiting marital status discrimina-
tion, the court explicitly discussed the non-discrimination contract language,
and invoked contract law to aid its analysis."4 The end result of Tumeo was
that a non-discrimination contract was partially responsible for equalizing
compensation between gay and married heterosexual employees by mandating
that the university could not discriminate between the two classes by granting
one group's partners health benefits and denying that benefit to the other
group.
Tumeo has added significance for contractual purgatory. The Tumeo court
distinguished cases where courts refused to enforce sexual orientation/marital
status non-discrimination clauses'47 on the grounds that those cases involved
143. The text of Amendment 2 is broad enough that a court could conclude a court is barred
from recognizing a purely private, contractual claim because Amendment 2 prohibits any state
entity from recognizing claims of discrimination against gay people.
144. Tumeo v. University of Alaska, No. 4FA-94-43 Civ., 1995 WL 238359 (Alaska Super.
1995) (holding university's health plan violates Board of Regents' policies against marital status
discrimination by refusing to extend health insurance benefits to employees' same-sex partners).
Tumeo is an example of contractual purgatory, of course, only if the Board of Regents' policy
against marital status discrimination is a contract, rather than a regulation akin to a statute. The
Vermont Labor Relations Board also enforced a sexual orientation non-discrimination policy,
forcing the University of Vermont to extend domestic partnership benefits to faculty members on
the same basis that it extended benefits to partners of married employees. Grievance of B.M., S.S.,
C.H. and J.R., No. 92-32 (Vt. Lab. Rel. Bd. June 4, 1993) (copy on file with the author). An
Oregon trial court has similarly ordered the state to grant benefits to gay couples under state con-
stitutional and statutory prohibitions of sex discrimination. The decision, however, is being ap-
pealed and the parties do not expect a final resolution until 1998. Domestic Partners: Oregon
Attorney General to Appeal Ruling on Benefits to Same Sex Partners, 1996 DAILY LAB. REP. 171
d9 (Sept. 4, 1996).
However, other tribunals have refused to accord employees domestic partnership benefits
on the basis of a sexual orientation and/or marital status non-discrimination clause in a union
contract. In re Michigan State Univ., 104 Lab. Arb. 516 (1995) (declining to extend domestic
partnership benefits based on union and management's prior negotiations); In re Kent State Univ.,
103 Lab. Arb. 338 (1994) (holding that faculty member was not discriminated against on the basis
of sexual orientation by university refusing to extend domestic partnership benefits despite sexual
orientation non-discrimination clause in collective bargaining agreement).
145. Tumeo, 1995 WL 238359, at *4. The Board of Regents' Regulation provided in relevant
part, "The University of Alaska does not engage in impermissible discrimination.... The Uni-
versity of Alaska makes its programs and activities available without discrimination on the basis
of ... marital status." ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) also prohibited marital status discrimina-
tion. Id.
146. Tumeo, 1995 WL 238359, at *3 ("[Tihis appeal involves questions of contract law,
constitutional law, and statutory interpretation.") (emphasis added).
147. Id. at *8 (citing Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct.
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conflicting statutes that had to be harmonized so as not to nullify either stat-
ute. But if a gay employee's claim is based on contract rather than statute,
then the court can recognize a gay-related contract benefit without nullifying a
statute.
A specific case illustrates how contract may sometimes be better for gay
people then public rules. Ross v. Denver Department of Health and Hospi-
tals'" involved one ordinance providing medical leave to care for family
members and another barring sexual orientation discrimination. Had Mary
Ross been able to assert a contractual rather than an ordinance-based non-dis-
crimination provision (in other words, a private rule instead of a public rule),
then perhaps the Colorado Court of Appeals might have granted her medical
leave to care for her ailing life partner by construing the contract clause to
provide more protection since a contract can define spouse without reference
to state law. As it was, the court was left to construe two public rules consis-
tently, and chose to nullify the non-discrimination provision in order to en-
force the definition of family in the sick leave provision.
A non-discrimination clause in a contract, however, cannot guarantee
judicial enforcement. In Rovira v. AT&T, a federal district court upheld
AT&T's denial of ERISA death benefits to a lesbian employee's partner.49
Although AT&T's personnel policies forbade sexual orientation and marital
status discrimination, the court concluded that AT&T could discriminate on
this basis in according benefits since the ERISA plan did not incorporate the
non-discrimination policies."s While this invocation is confusing given the
court's finding that the ERISA plan was a "contract between private par-
ties"'"' for benefits and AT&T contracted not to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation or marital status, it also illustrates the way that public rules
often operate to the detriment of gay couples. But while courts may find some
public or contract rule to nullify a contract benefitting gay employees, the pos-
sibility of contractual protections still outweighs the current state of near cer-
tainty of lack of public rules protecting gay people.
The above examples of gay cohabitation contracts and employ-
ment/education contracts illustrate that contracts for both love and money can
serve a progressive agenda for gay people. These examples illustrate that when
the government default rule is hostile to gay people, any opportunity to con-
tract around that rule is advantageous. As long as the contract is not against
public policy, judges generally do not second-guess the contractual intentions
of two or more consenting adults.
App. 1992) (refusing to grant benefits to same-sex partner because non-discrimination statute
harmonized with statute defining spouse as legally married to the employee)).
148. 883 P.2d 516, 518 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
149. 817 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
150. Rovira, 817 F. Supp. at 1071.




Having discussed gay people's place in both public condemnation and
contractual purgatory, I will now address the extent to which gay people have
public rights. I have already defined public rights as including constitutional or
statutory protections against discrimination and freedom to take certain actions
without fear of penalty." 2 Public rights can also be defined as "one's affir-
mative claim against another."'' 3 Either way, gay people enjoy almost no
public rights to be free from discrimination.
When the issue of gay rights comes up for public debate, gay people gen-
erally lose. In 1993, for example, President Clinton initiated a national debate
on the military's ban on gays instead of keeping his campaign promise to
simply lift the ban. The end result of the debate was, in effect, a substantially
similar ban on gay people in the military, popularly known as Don't Ask/
Don't Tell. 54 Along the way gay people had to stomach virulent homopho-
bia every day in the press, as person after person articulated his or her venom-
ous sentiments against gay people.' This vitriolic national debate about gay
people in the military illustrated that gays are far from having public rights.
But there are occasional pockets of potential at state, local, and, to a lesser
extent, federal levels. Below I outline several vehicles for public rights, and
analyze their current efficacy for gay people.
1. Gay Marriage
Hawaii courts have recently recognized gay marriage, but the recognition
is currently stayed pending appeal.' 56 Before Hawaii took this action, Utah
led the charge to limit the effect of Hawaii's action by refusing to recognize
same sex marriages performed in another state;'57 Colorado, Illinois, South
152. See discussion supra in part 11.
153. Walter W. Cook, introduction to HOHFELD, supra note 16, at 7-8. Under Hohfeld's anal-
ysis, gay people generally have "no-right," i.e., the absence of a right. Hohfeld picked the term to
resemble "nobody" and "nothing," which seems to capture the legal status of gay people as unde-
serving of protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Under Hohfeld's
analysis, those who discriminate against gay people are accorded a privilege to do so. Gay
people's no-right and heterosexuals' privilege are Hohfeldian correlatives, since they are opposite
sides of the same coin. Id. at 5. For a further discussion of Hohfeld's analysis in relation to my
model, see supra note 16.
154. John Lancaster, Final Rules on Gays Set, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1993, at AI (rules out-
lining revised ban on gay people in the military suggests marching in a gay rights parade by itself
is likely not grounds for investigation, but two men holding hands off-duty is grounds for investi-
gation). But recent evidence suggests that the Don't Ask/Don't Tell ban on gays in the military
has resulted in more, rather than fewer, discharges and investigations for being gay. Philip
Shenon, Armed Forces Still Question Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at I (prosecutions
up 17% under the Don't Ask/Don't Tell policy). President Clinton similarly aligned himself with
anti-gay Republicans by publicly promising to sign the Defense of Marriage Act the same week
the Supreme Court decided Romer v. Evans. Todd S. Purdum, President Would Sign Legislation
Striking at Homosexual Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1996, at AI.
155. See Shenon, supra note 154.
156. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec. 3, 1996) (ruling
that equal protection clause of Hawaii constitution requires state to allow same-sex marriage).
Essoyan & Boxall, supra note 66, at A3.
157. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1995) (marriages between persons of the same sex declared
prohibited and void); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (1995) ("A marriage solemnized in any other
1996] 1145
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Dakota, and many other states have either passed similar legislation or consid-
ered doing so.' Congress and President Clinton similarly acted preemptive-
ly to limit the effect of Hawaii's action by enacting the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA). Under DOMA, federal law only recognizes opposite-sex mar-
riages, and no state need recognize a same-sex marriage under the Constitu-
tion's Full Faith and Credit Clause.'59
But even if some states redefine marriage in an attempt to avoid recogniz-
ing same-sex marriages performed in Hawaii, the single act of a single state
recognizing same-sex marriage could catapult gay people into the realm of
public rights in numerous states, since at least some states will likely recog-
nize Hawaiian gay marriages. The numerous statutory rights attendant on
marriage illustrate the social and legal impact of recognizing gay marriage
anywhere. These benefits include intestacy rights; workers' compensation and
unemployment benefits; maintenance, child support, visitation and property
distribution upon relationship dissolution; evidentiary privileges; and joint
filing for bankruptcy." ° Moreover, courts recognize common law claims,
such as loss of consortium and wrongful death, only for married heterosexu-
als. 6 ' Thus, Hawaii's recognition of same-sex marriages could be a major
public rights victory for gay people. But until the Hawaii litigation is resolved,
gay people remain in contractual purgatory for most purposes.
country, state, or territory, if valid where solemnized, is valid here, unless it is a marriage: (1) that
would be prohibited or declared void in this state under 30-1-2(1) [bigamy].... (3) [either party
under 14 years of age] .... or (5) [both persons are the same sex]."); see also David W. Dunlap,
Some States Trying to Stop Gay Marriages Before They Start, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at A18
("Utah legislators voted overwhelmingly this month to deny recognition to marriages performed
elsewhere that do not conform to Utah law. This would include same-sex unions.").
158. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Foes of Gay Marriage Foiled in California Senate, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 6, 1996, at A24 (noting that 35 states have considered anti-gay marriage legislation)
[hereinafter Dunlap, Foes]; David W. Dunlap, Fearing a Toehold for Gay Marriages, Conserva-
tives Rush to Bar the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at A13 (noting that 19 states have consid-
ered anti-gay marriage legislation, including Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming and that the states where anti-gay marriage measures became
law include Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah). While the Colorado legislature passed an anti-gay
marriage bill, Governor Romer vetoed it, reaffirming in the same breath that "marriage 'should be
reserved for the union of a man and a woman."' Thomas Frank, Same Sex Ban Vetoed: Romer
Strives to Find Some Middle Ground, DENV. POST, Mar. 26, 1996, at Al. Undeterred, the Colora-
do legislature re-introduced a similar measure as this article was going into publication. Michelle
D. Johnston, Gay-Marriage Ban Ok'd, DENV. POST, Feb. 14, 1997, at IB, 3B.
159. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
160. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIB-
ERTY TO CIVIIZED COMMrrMENT 66-70 (1996) (listing practical benefits of marriage for gay cou-
ples). Additionally, a heterosexual couple may jointly file for bankruptcy relief, but a same-sex
couple may not. In re Allen, 186 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
161. But see Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (recognizing negligent infliction of
emotional distress for cohabitant of the injured person). However, no state recognizes loss of con-
sortium for unmarried couples. Alexander J. Drago & Dean M. Monti, Expanding the Family:
Testing the Limits of Tort Liability, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 232, 239 n. 18 (1994) (citing federal district
courts recognizing loss of consortium claims for unmarried couples, but noting that the state
courts in which the federal courts sat subsequently refused to allow consortium claims regarding
unmarried couples); see also GEORGE CHRISTIE & JAMES E. MEEKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 766 (1990); PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 552 (1994).
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2. Non-Discrimination and Domestic Partnership Legislation
Another public right is statutory freedom from invidious discrimination. A
handful of states afford some public rights to be free from some forms of
sexual orientation discrimination. As of February 1996, nine states and the
District of Columbia had statutory protections against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. 62 But these protections are often interpreted nar-
rowly: classified ads are not a "public accommodation" for gay people; 63 re-
fusal to accord gay couples insurance on the same basis as heterosexual cou-
ples is marital status rather than sexual orientation discrimination;" and
marriage remains an exclusively heterosexual privilege even in jurisdictions
with civil rights laws protecting gay people for some purposes. 65
Some cities and municipalities also protect sexual marginorities against
discrimination and/or extend benefits to the domestic partners of city employ-
ees. At least 163 cities and counties have accorded public rights to gay people
through ordinances prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination."6 Similarly,
three states and 52 municipalities, school districts, or other government entities
recognize domestic partnerships and extend some benefits. 67 These ordinanc-
162. HRC LIST, supra note 22. The states are: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. In addition, at least eight states
have executive orders protecting state employees from sexual orientation discrimination. Stephanie
L. Grauerholz, Comment, Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated: The Emergence of a Fundamental
Right to Participate in the Political Process, 44 DEPAuL L. REV. 841, 855 (1995).
163. Hatheway v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 873 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990). Apparently, newspaper advertising is not a public accommodation for gays, but is a public
accommodation for labor unions. In contrast to Hatheway, a union survived a newspaper's motion
to dismiss the union's complaint that the newspaper violated the public accommodation statute by
refusing to publish its advertisements. The newspaper had argued that the newspaper was not a
public accommodation. Local Painters Union Local 802 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., No. 3165
(Equal Opportunities Comm'n, Madison, Wis. file closed Dec. 24, 1987). However, the issue was
never conclusively determined because the parties settled out of court. P. Cameron Devore &
Robert D. Sack, Advertising and Commercial Speech, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1996, at 545
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-
3980, 1996). In 1995, the Supreme Court similarly struck down Massachusetts' application of its
public accommodations statute to allow the organizers of a St. Patrick's Day parade to exclude
gay Irish marchers. Thus at least two state's public accommodations laws have been explicitly
applied to exclude gay people. Id. at 547 (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisex-
ual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995)).
164. Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); Beaty
v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court in Beaty reasoned:
[T]here is nothing arbitrary about defendant's issuance of joint umbrella policies only to
married persons. Given the legal unity of interest and the shared responsibilities atten-
dant upon a marriage, an insurer could reasonably conclude there is no significant risk in
covering both an insured and his or her spouse.... With regard to unmarried couples of
whatever sexual orientation, an insurer could conclude the relationship lacks the assur-
ance of permanence necessary to assess with confidence the risks insured against in a
joint umbrella policy.
Id. at 598-99.
165. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 320 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding mar-
riage license bureau's refusal to issue marriage license to same-sex couples does not violate the
District of Columbia's Human Rights Act). Marriage will not be exclusively heterosexual if the
Hawaii Supreme Court upholds the lower court's recognition of gay marriage in Baehr v. Miike,
No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec. 3, 1996).
166. HRC LIST, supra note 22.
167. Smothers, supra note 22, at 25.
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es have been enforced to remedy a restaurant's refusing to seat a lesbian cou-
ple"r and a health club's terminating a gay man's membership."6 But the
very same ordinance that prohibited discrimination in health club membership
did not prevent Big Brothers, Inc. from asking prospective big brothers about
their sexual orientation, and outing any gay prospective big brothers to all
prospective little brothers and their mothers.
17
1
Ordinances recognizing gay rights also face preemption challenges. Sever-
al courts have found that municipal protections for gay people are preempted
by state law. Thus, if a state has no statute banning sexual orientation discrim-
ination, enforcement of any local ordinance can be barred because the state
civil rights statute may be deemed to occupy the field and prevent protection
against sexual orientation discrimination by its silence.' Or the
municipality's action according domestic partnership benefits might be found
to be ultra vires and in conflict with state statutes.' The same preemption
arguments levelled against local ordinances can perhaps be aimed at state
laws, leaving only federal protections against anti-gay discrimination. But no
federal law protects gay people against discrimination.7 7 At the end of the
day, gay people have slim public rights through state statutes and municipal
ordinances, leaving contract as the only practical alternative vehicle for obtain-
ing legal relief until the Supreme Court decided Romer v. Evans.
168. Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1984).
169. Blanding v. Sport & Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
170. Big Brothers, Inc. v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 284 N.W.2d 823, 827, 828
(Minn. 1979) (requiring Big Brothers, Inc. to inform mothers of sexual orientation of all prospec-
tive big brothers would unduly burden mothers by forcing them to determine relevance of sexual
orientation).
171. See, e.g., Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 38 (Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that legislature expressed its intent to exclude local regulation from the field of fair
housing and employment regulation); Under 21 v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 1985)
(holding that Mayor of New York City was preempted from issuing an executive order banning
sexual orientation discrimination by city contractors because the state legislature did not ban sexu-
al orientation discrimination); Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-
Eighties, 10 DAYTON L. REV. 459, 481 (1985).
172. See City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995) (invalidating domestic
partnership benefits to city employees as ultra vires); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d
107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that city exceeded its authority in authorizing reimbursement
to city employees for health care insurance costs for same-sex domestic partners). Atlanta's City
Council recently passed domestic partnership benefits again, in an effort to grant the benefits in
compliance with McKinney. As before, opponents have challenged the action. Smothers, supra
note 22, at 25. But Denver's domestic partnership ordinance recently survived a taxpayer chal-
lenge similar to those in Minneapolis and Atlanta. Howard Pankratz, Denver's Gay Benefits Stand,
DENV. POST, Dec. 20, 1996, at 1.
173. Rivera, supra note 171, at 465 (gay people not protected by Title VII). But gay people
do have some limited protection from discrimination in federal employment. Id. at 483. President
Clinton did not sign a government-wide Executive Order prohibiting sexual orientation discrimina-
tion in federal employment as he promised during his first campaign. Instead such policies are
being implemented on an agency-by-agency basis. Al Kamen, The Federal Page, WASH. POST,
Jan. 24, 1994. at A15.
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3. Taking the Anti-Gay Initiative
Anti-gay initiatives were the strongest weapon for opposing gay public
rights until Evans. They are sodomy laws with bite, particularly in relation to
my model. Even if sodomy laws are on the books, they are rarely enforced.
But an initiative such as Colorado's Amendment 2, which provided no state
entity could accord protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation, would have barred gay people from any real civil rights in a far more
comprehensive way than sodomy laws. If Amendment 2 had gone into effect,
Colorado could have enforced any statute solely against gay people, without
any fear of liability for sexual orientation discrimination. The Denver Public
Library could deny library cards to any gay person. Public schools could ban
gay students from attending. Police could ticket only owners of cars with rain-
bow flag stickers'74 for traffic violations. Finally, any efforts to contract
around the anti-gay default rule might not have been enforceable.'
Romer v. Evans may put to rest the anti-gay initiative movement, at least
measures such as Amendment 2 that impose on gay people alone the burden
of getting protections against discrimination through the state constitution.
Evans is remarkable for at least two things. First, it states that Colorado can-
not classify gay people "to make them unequal to everyone else."'76 Second,
it provides that animosity against gay people is not a legitimate state purpose
under the Equal Protection Clause.'77 After Evans, defenders of anti-gay
measures from the military ban to anti-gay-marriage statutes will likely have
to explain how their laws are motivated by an interest other than anti-gay
animosity.
But even after Evans, the journey for gay public rights is decidedly uphill.
When gay rights came to a popular vote in Colorado, Amendment 2 passed.
Americans feel more negative toward gay people than toward any other group
save illegal immigrants.' But not every state's voters have accepted the in-
vitation to impose state-wide legal disabilities on gay people: Oregon and
Maine narrowly defeated such measures in recent years,'79 and proponents in
174. The rainbow flag is a symbol of affiliation with the gay rights movement.
175. In a jurisdiction that does not protect gay people against discrimination, of course, all of
these acts might be permissible. And Amendment 2, had it become law, may well have precluded
Colorado courts from enforcing any gay-friendly terms in contracts, even contracts between pri-
vate parties. See supra note 119.
176. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
177. Id.
178. Sherrill, supra, note 42, at 469, 470 (documenting National Election Study data based on
a zero score for most extreme cold feelings, 50 for neither cold nor warm, and 100 for extremely
warm feelings). The data indicate that in 1994, 28.2% of Americans felt absolutely cold toward
gay people, 51.4% felt generally cold toward them, with a mean "temperature" of 35.7. Id. In
contrast, 24% of Americans' temperature with reference to illegal immigrants was zero, with a
mean temperature of 32.3. Id. In contrast, Americans felt warm toward Christian fundamentalists:
only 6.2% gave them a zero, and only 28.4% felt more cold than warm toward them. Id. Sherrill
contends that the only indicator for a jurisdiction passing gay rights legislation is gay bars per
capita, suggesting that only where gays concentrate can they hope for public rights. Id. at 472.
179. David W. Dunlap, Gay Politicians and Issues Win Major Victories, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 1995, at 34 ("A ballot initiative in Maine that would have denied civil rights protections to
homosexuals was rejected, 53 to 47 percent .... Similar measures were rejected last year in Ore-
gon and Idaho, by narrower margins.").
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Washington and Nevada have failed to get sufficient signatures to place an
anti-gay initiative on the ballot.8 0 However, voters may be more reluctant to
vote for gay rights than against measures to limit gay rights. 8' Many edi-
torial responses to Evans favored Scalia's vitriolic dissent, suggesting that
numerous voters disagree with the majority decision in Evans.'82 Romer v.
Evans' invalidation of Amendment 2 is a crucial step in gay people's progress
toward public rights under my model, but will not prevent anti-gay groups
from proposing new initiatives and other anti-gay measures.8 3 At this point,
Evans stands most clearly for the simultaneously modest and radical proposi-
tion that gay people may not be relegated to second class citizenship as a mat-
ter of law. Future cases will determine whether Evans is to sexual orientation
discrimination what Brown v. Board of Education"4 was to racial discrim-
ination.
4. Conclusion: Inchoate Public Rights
In short, gay people are generally somewhere between public condemna-
tion and contractual purgatory in my model, and in all three places on the
diagram in some jurisdictions such as Georgia.'85 They exist on the margins
180. Joni Baiter, The Son of 608? Please Spare Us, SEATTLE TIMEs, June 14, 1994, at BI
("Backers of two anti-gay-rights initiatives announced they couldn't collect enough signatures to
qualify for the ballot."); Maria L. La Ganga, Anti-Gay Initiative Fails to Make Nevada Ballot,
L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1994, at A3 (reporting that an anti-gay initiative failed to get sufficient sig-
natures to gain a place on ballot); see also Bettina Boxall, Despite Losing in '92, an Oregon
Group Is Backing a Revised Measure to Ban Laws Protecting Homosexuals, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7,
1994, at A14 (anti-gay initiative failed in Oregon in 1992 and Idaho Attorney General issued
opinion that similar anti-gay initiative in Idaho was unconstitutional).
181. "Of the 67 anti-gay initiatives since 1972, 76% have resulted in losses for gay rights
supporters. Of the 11 initiatives seeking to expand gay rights, 90% have resulted in losses for sup-
porters of gay rights." Donald P. Haider-Markel & Kenneth J. Meier, Legislative Victory,
Electoral Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles of Lesbian and Gay Rights, POL'Y
STUD. J. (forthcoming Dec. 1996).
182. See, e.g., George F. Will, Terminal Silliness, WASH. POST, May 22, 1996, at A21 (de-
scribing Amendment 2 as the resistance of heterosexual Coloradans "provoked by the aggressive
and successful campaigns of homosexuals and bisexuals for state and local laws protecting them
against discrimination" and agreeing with Scalia's description of Amendment 2 as a "modest at-
tempt ... to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minor-
ity").
183. Anti-gay activists in Idaho intended to put a measure on their November 1996 ballot,
which would have been similar to Colorado's Amendment 2. The organizers, however, were un-
able to obtain enough signatures to place it on the ballot. Perhaps their failure was due in part to
the Idaho Attorney General's opinion that the measure would be unconstitutional. Boxall, supra
note 180, at A]4.
184. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
185. Georgia's Attorney General recently fired an attorney for having a same-sex Jewish
wedding, Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995), reh'g granted, 78 F.3d 499 (1996)
(First Amendment intimate association claims remanded to be determined under strict scrutiny test
and intimate expression claim under.compelling interest test), yet Atlanta protects gay people from
discrimination. While Atlanta was recently enjoined from extending health benefits to partners of
unmarried city employees, City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 545 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995), it recently
passed a similar measure in an attempt to grant domestic partnership benefits and comply with
McKinney. Lewis Becker, Recognition of Domestic Partnerships by Governmental Entities and
Private Employers, I NAT'L J. SEX. ORIENT. L. 1 (1996); Smothers, supra note 22, at 25. Finally,
Georgia has enforced same-sex cohabitation contracts, both express and implied. See Crooke v.
Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992); Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. 1979).
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of contract to the extent that enforcement of a cohabitation contract may
require disguising the parties' entire relationship as a business affair to avoid
public policy problems and potential conflict with sodomy laws." 6 But
Evans is perhaps the most major move toward public rights gay people have
ever enjoyed, and makes equal protection for gay people a possibility under
the Constitution. Progress and setbacks occur so quickly, though, that gay
rights may be fully demoted to public condemnation or catapulted to public
rights in a single court decision.
Perhaps gay people have generally fared better under contractual than
public rights due to principles underlying judicial interpretation of contracts as
opposed to interpretation of legislation. On the margins, judges are arguably
more free to examine moral considerations when interpreting legislation than
when interpreting contracts, since statutory interpretation involves one branch
of government interpreting the work of another branch. Courts have been, after
all, in the business of reviewing legislation for potential constitutional viola-
tions since Marbury v. Madison.'87 Judicial interpretation of contracts, in
contrast, is often informed by a hands-off rhetoric. Judges are supposed to
enforce voluntary agreements of private parties (absent extreme circumstances
such as lack of capacity or duress), regardless of whether they view the agree-
ment as good, bad, or indifferent. The fact that gay cohabitation contracts are
sometimes enforced, even in states with sodomy laws, is striking in compari-
son with judicial and legislative resistance to interpret non-discrimination
statutes as granting gay public rights such as marriage.
Doubtless many judges enforce only the so-called plain language of stat-
utes, and others delve into the intentions behind integrated contracts. 8 But
at least some courts have given broad effect to what they deem to be legisla-
tive intent, particularly when doing so yields a socially popular result. 9 Two
186. Sodomy laws are not ubiquitous; some states have invalidated sodomy statutes under
their state constitutions. See, e.g., People v. Onfre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (N.Y. 1980) (striking down
New York sodomy law as violative of state and federal constitutions). Since Bowers v. Hardwick,
at least three states have struck down their sodomy laws under the state constitution. LESBIANS,
GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 153 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (listing Michigan, Kentucky,
and Texas as states that struck down their sodomy laws post-Bowers).
187. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). But some courts and commentators urge judges to restrict themselves
to the so-called plain meaning of a statute rather than interpreting its terms on any moral beliefs
held by the judges. The feasibility of identifying plain meaning has in tum been questioned by
other commentators.
188. Compare, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442
P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) ("If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to
discover contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner in which they were ar-
ranged. Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents.") with Trident Ct. v. Con-
necticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying, "reluctantly," the Thomas
Drayage rule despite the court's preference for enforcing the plain language of the contract).
189. Patterns of statutory and contract interpretation are essentially empirical, and a full sur-
vey is beyond the scope of this article. However, several opinions by Judge Easterbrook, known
for his political conservatism, suggest that even a self-described textualist may be willing to mas-
sage a statute on occasion to achieve a particular result but strictly enforce the language of a com-
mercial contract. In Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Foster, Judge Easterbrook broadly inter-
preted regulations determining eligibility for benefits in order to deny benefits to a disabled work-
er whose pneumoconiosis was not the sole cause of his disability. Freeman United Coal Mining
Co. v. Foster, 30 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1994). To reach this result, Judge Easterbrook quoted from
another one of his opinions:
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cases suggest this pattern, one from the nineteenth century concerning a statute
barring testimony against whites, and a recent one interpreting a non-discrim-
ination statute.
First, the racial case. George Hall was convicted of murder based on the
testimony of Chinese witnesses." Hall appealed, arguing that the testimony
was inadmissible under a California statute barring the testimony of anyone
"black," "Mulatto," or "Indian" against whites. The California Supreme Court
agreed with Hall, reasoning that the legislature intended the statute to bar tes-
timony of Chinese witnesses, since Columbus had mistaken Indians for Asians
upon his arrival in North America."' The court further asserted that the stat-
ute was intended to "shield [whites] from the testimony of the degraded and
demoralized caste[s]," and that allowing Chinese people to testify would lead
to full civil fights, which would be disastrous given Chinese people's "preju-
dice ... mendacity .. inferior[ity], and . . . incapa[city for] progress or
intellectual development."' 92 While extreme in its racism, People v. Hall also
illustrates my more mundane point that judges are sometimes willing to use
considerable poetic license in statutory interpretation when popular sentiment
mandates a particular result.'
The extent of public fights for unmarried couples is perhaps as intense a
social concern now as Chinese people were to white Californians in the 1850s.
Statutes have meanings, sometimes even "plain" ones, but these do not spring directly
from the page. Words are arbitrary signs, having meaning only to the extent writers and
readers share an understanding .... Language in general, and legislation in particular, is
a social enterprise to which both speakers and listeners contribute, drawing on back-
ground understandings and the structure and circumstances of the utterance. Slicing a
statute into phrases while ignoring their contents ... is a formula for disaster.
Id. at 838 (quoting Hermann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992)).
In Hermann, Judge Easterbrook denied a former employee insurance coverage under ERISA,
explicitly "massaging" the statute to account for congressional errors due to hasty drafting, while
in the same breath denying that he based the decision on legislative history. Hermann, 978 F.2d at
982. These cases show that even judges known for textualism can be quite liberal in interpreting a
law or regulation in order to give effect to what they believe is an underlying statutory purpose.
But in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990),
Judge Easterbrook enforced the language of a loan agreement, reasoning that "[flirms that have
negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their
trading partners, without being mulcted for lack of 'good faith,"' and "knowledge that literal en-
forcement means some mismatch between the parties' expectations and the outcome does not
imply a general duty of 'kindness' in performance, or a judicial oversight into whether a party had
'good cause' to act as it did. Parties to a contract are not each others' fiduciaries." Id. at 1357.
For further discussion of Judge Easterbrook's revitalization in Kham of a classical approach to
contracts which disregards the Uniform Commercial Code's approach to contracts, see Dennis M.
Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOwA L. REV.
503 (1991).
190. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
191. Hall, 4 Cal. at 400 ("When Columbus first landed upon the shores of this continent,...
he imagined ... that the Island of San Salvador was one of those Islands of the Chinese Sea...
near... India... [and] he gave to the Islanders the name of Indians .... From that time, down
to a very recent period, the American Indians and the Mongolian, or Asiatic, were regarded as the
same type of the human species."); PATRICIA N. LIMERICK, TmE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE
UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST 261-62 (1987).
192. Hall, 4 Cal. at 403, 405.
193. LIMERICK, supra note 191, at 259-69 (describing white antipathy to Chinese, Japanese,
and other people of color in the nineteenth century American West).
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In Cooper v. French, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted a statute pro-
hibiting marital status discrimination to only protect people who are married,
not unmarried cohabitants.' 9 The court reasoned that a landlord could refuse
to rent an apartment to an unmarried heterosexual couple on religious grounds
because the statutory intent was to discourage fornication and protect marriage
rather than protect unmarried couples from discrimination.
By reading the non-discrimination statute in the shadow of an antiquated
fornication statute, the court gave legal effect to its view that cohabitation
"corrodes the institutions which have sustained our civilization, namely, mar-
riage and family life."'95 The Minnesota Supreme Court's passionate defense
of the traditional family suggests that even without a fornication statute the
court would have found a way to interpret the non-discrimination statute to
allow marital status discrimination. Both People v. Hall and Cooper v. French
suggest that, at least when interpreting statutes governing incendiary issues
like race relations and sex, courts may skirt statutory plain language and resort
to broad readings of legislative intent in order to reach a result favoring
majoritarian morality. 96
Perhaps there is something about contract doctrine or rhetoric that makes
it easier to protect gay people as a matter of contract than it is to protect them
with public rights. The following section suggests some possible reasons why
194. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
195. Id. at 8. The court explained (without citing any authority) why it found the state's argu-
ment "astonishing" since cohabitation causes numerous social ills:
There are certain moral values and institutions that have served western civilization well
for eons .... Before abandoning fundamental values and institutions, we must pause
and take stock of our present social order: millions of drug abusers; rampant child
abuse; a rising underclass without marketable job skills; children roaming the streets;
children with only one parent or no parent at all; and children growing up with no one
to guide them in developing any set of values. How can we expect anything else when
the state itself contributes, by arguments of this kind, to further erosion of fundamental
institutions that have formed the foundation of our civilization for centuries?
Id. at 11. With language like this, it is hard to imagine how any statute could be drafted in such a
way that the Minnesota Supreme Court would recognize the rights of unmarried cohabitors against
discrimination.
196. A third case involves an issue less socially dramatic than race or sex. Instead, it involves
a promissory note signed by a borrower who did not understand what he was signing. In FDIC v.
Culver, 640 F. Supp. 725 (D. Kan. 1986), a federal court in Kansas enforced a promissory note
against a farmer who signed it when it was blank and thought it was only a receipt for $30,000
that a bank had loaned him through the man managing his farm. By the time the FDIC tried to
enforce the note, it had been filled in for $50,000, and the FDIC claimed a right to enforce it as a
holder in due course because the circumstances of Culver signing the note did not amount to fraud
in factum. U.C.C. § 3-305 defines fraud in factum as the lender's misrepresentations inducing the
borrower to sign "with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of [the
instrument's] character or knowledge," and the Official Comment to § 3-305 includes being
"tricked into signing a note in the belief that it is merely a receipt" as fraud in factum, which
would defeat a holder in due course's claim. However, rather than apply the plain language of
U.C.C. § 3-305 and its Comment, the court followed an 1884 case where an essentially illiterate
farmer was liable under a note despite fraud that would certainly amount to fraud in factum under
the U.C.C. Culver is relevant for our purposes here because it demonstrates judicial willingness to
disregard the plain language of a statute (here one meant to protect a debtor from liability on a
note obtained by fraud in factum) in order to enforce the plain language of a contract. In doing so,
the court arguably demonstrates a greater willingness to disregard statutory language than contrac-
tual language.
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gay people have often fared better under contract than public rights, and posits
the theoretical implications of those successes.
V. CONTRACTUAL PURGATORY'S SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL: How GILDEN
MAY STILL BE GOLD
The subversive potential of my model is both practical and theoretical. As
a practical matter, contractual purgatory offers gay people a means to the de-
sired end of legal protections for four reasons: (1) contractual rights may be an
incremental step to achieving public rights; (2) it is generally easier to con-
vince a smaller group to protect an unpopular minority; (3) contract rhetoric
often skirts majoritarian morality; and (4) contractual purgatory may habituate
heterosexuals to the notion of gay rights, setting the stage for public rights for
gay people.
On the theoretical side, contractual purgatory is subversive for two rea-
sons: (1) it contributes to the social construction of gay people as persons
because the ability to contract is a crucial component of legal personhood; and
(2) it destabilizes hierarchical categories when progressives use a conservative
tool to accomplish progressive ends. Both practical and theoretical implications
of contractual purgatory are discussed below.
A point to consider prior to discussing the advantages of contractual pur-
gatory is the general question of whether it benefits sexual marginorities more
than it harms them. On the one hand, contract validates closeting when judges
enforce only those cohabitation contracts that are structured to mask the
parties' relationship. On the other hand, though, contractual purgatory may be
either the best gay people can expect for the moment, or an essential step in
the process of obtaining public rights. The optimism of my proposal turns on
whether one believes public rights are a realistic expectation. 7 If so, con-
tractual purgatory is just crumbs. If not, the contractual way station is better
than criminal hell. I address both of these implications, suggesting that even if
Romer v. Evans and Baehr v. Miike suggest the possibility of public rights for
gay people, contractual purgatory offers an essential and immediate benefit for
gay people in that it establishes a crucial foundation to their legal personhood
by recognizing their contracts.
A. Practical Implications of Contractual Purgatory
1. The (Half) Loaf You Save May Be Your Own 9 s
Contract may not always be as dangerous for have-nots as is commonly
thought. Instead, it may offer a happy medium between the extremes of public
197. Mary Becker apparently is more optimistic than I am. She suggests in her comments to
this paper that gay people will win marriage rights, at which time contractual rights will not only
pale in comparison, but will actually disserve have-nots in their relationships if contracts are used
the way they are now to contract around family law rules protecting weaker parties. Becker, supra
note 34.
198. 1 purloined this heading from a bread truck in Seattle. A sign on the truck admonished
other drivers to "drive carefully, for the loaf you save may be your own."
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condemnation and public rights. Of course, contractual purgatory only benefits
those who would otherwise suffer public condemnation. If gay people are
closer to the right side of my diagram (criminalization) than the left (public
rights), contract may have particular pull under queer theory. If, however,
Romer v. Evans and Baehr v. Miike signal the dawn of public rights for gays,
then perhaps the best strategy is to seek public rights directly instead of set-
tling for the private way station.
But contract may have some advantages even if Evans and Baehr do ulti-
mately lead to gay public rights. Contract may benefit marginorities in some
circumstances.'" Kellye Testy draws on the work of Ruthann Robson to sug-
gest that lesbians can contract around hostile public rules through relationship-
oriented contracts.2" While Testy defends contract doctrines such as promis-
sory estoppel and unjust enrichment as consistent with feminism,"0 ' I would
embrace contract a step beyond the equitable contract doctrines she discusses.
In a homophobic society, perhaps the rigidity of classical contract theory can
sometimes benefit gay people, contrary to the general belief that classical
contract theory tends to benefit people with power at the expense of those on
the margins. In Crooke v. Gilden, for example, the plaintiff prevailed on her
express cohabitation contract claims only because the parol evidence rule ex-
cluded evidence of the lesbian relationship from judicial consideration.2 2
The victory is sweet when closeted relief is compared to the only alternative:
no relief. Testy correctly observed that "[clontract has no essence-it is a
social construct and will mutate based on its time, place and users.""2 3 Since
I am skeptical about gay people obtaining meaningful public rights soon, con-
tract seems to be a workable alternative, particularly if the only other option is
public condemnation.
That, of course, is not to say that contract is the best alternative. Certainly
the plaintiff in Crooke v. Gilden paid a price by obscuring her relationship
from judicial view in order to recover.2" But perhaps that price is out-
weighed by the actual recovery. Perhaps Gilden should have the option of
disguising (and enforcing) her relationship if her only other option is to
stomach societal refusal to acknowledge any part of that relationship except to
single it out for criminal attention.0 5 This remains true even if it results in
199. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical Approaches and the Double Bind of
Surrogacy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 303 (1993) (applying four feminist approaches to the problem
of surrogacy contracts and concluding, "there are advantages and disadvantages both to nonen-
forcement and specific enforcement" of surrogacy contracts); Testy, supra note 4, at 229-30 (sug-
gesting that contract may be a tool to counteract patriarchy).
200. Testy, supra note 4, at 225-27 (citing Robson & Valentine, supra note 121).
201. Id. at 228-29 (discussing confluence of feminist theory and relational and communitarian
interpretations of contract propounded by scholars such as Ian MacNeil).
202. Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
203. Testy, supra note 4, at 229.
204. Mark Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereo-
types, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 595-96 (1992)
(discussing the costs of concealing gay sexual orientation to self-esteem, mental health, and com-
munity building).
205. See id. at 571 ("Gay men and lesbians are tolerable only if they keep their secret.");
"Society tolerates gay men and lesbians so long as they carefully hide their sexual orientation." Id.
at 583; and "If gay people lead clandestine lives, others need not admit they know of them or
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accommodation and perpetuation of institutional homophobia. As illustrated in
the recent movie Babe, a pig faced with either visiting the slaughterhouse or
functionally disguising himself as a border collie feels fortunate to avoid the
axe by any means necessary.2" While Babe's action may be scant solace to
the pigs that do end up at the slaughterhouse, at least Babe escaped this fate.
Moreover, Babe's sheepherding disguise may transform others' conceptions of
which animals can do sheepdogs' work.
2. Safety in (Small) Numbers
The second practical advantage of contractual purgatory turns on the fact
that majoritarian morality is the major obstacle to gay rights. Contracts provide
a serviceable tool for counteracting majoritarian morality because by definition
only the contracting parties and the court need to agree to create a legal rule.
This aspect of contract makes it a particularly attractive tool for marginorities
because by definition they are few in number and/or politically weak. As a
result, marginorities are often too marginalized to obtain public benefits from
the legislature or courts.0 7 Certainly judicial enforcement of gay cohabitation
contracts may be hindered by homophobia if a judge views the contract as
meretricious or against public policy.28 But contract doctrines such as the
parol evidence rule may keep out evidence that the parties are lovers, thus
skirting public policy concerns." 9 Contract rhetoric that a judge should en-
approve of them. The extravagant demand inherent in public acknowledgement of a gay sexual
orientation is forcing onlookers to take sides." Id. at 590 (internal quotes omitted).
206. As Alan Chen pointed out to me, Babe does not explicitly choose between these two op-
tions. Instead, he affiliates with the sheepdogs because one is kind to him in a maternal way, and
he only discovers late in the movie that pigs' sole purpose is to feed people. But I read Babe's
initial choice as being in line with barnyard hierarchy. A sheep is also kind to Babe early on, but
he chooses instead to model himself after the more socially powerful border collies. Moreover, he
does seem to have a sense from the beginning that being a working animal is more prestigious.
Babe's role as ingenue is central to the film's message; the duck who tries to function as a rooster
to avoid the chopping block falls and must leave the farm. Only Babe, who passes as a sheepdog
in innocent imitation successfully inverts the barnyard hierarchy to show that a pig can do a
sheepdog's work. In short, Babe redefines the identities of both pig and sheepdog.
207. It may be easier for some rights to be obtained through the courts than through the legis-
lature. Heterosexual marriages are statutorily recognized. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104
(1987) ("A marriage between a man and a woman licensed, solemnized, and registered as provid-
ed in this part 1 is valid in this state."). However, judicial intervention was required to extend the
public right of marriage to interracial couples in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and to
people delinquent in their child support obligations in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
Hawaii is the first state to recognize same-sex marriage, based on a state constitutional challenge.
Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec. 3, 1996). Even if Hawaii's
Supreme Court affirms and recognizes same-sex marriage, other states likely will not recognize
those unions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. The antici-
pated grounds for the anti-gay states' refusal is that a number of states have the right to decline to
give full faith and credit to other state's judgments if doing so would violate the recognizing
state's public policy. The 24 states that have statutes criminalizing sodomy have ready-made
grounds for determining that same-sex marriage is contrary to their public policy. And several
states have already indicated their unwillingness to recognize same-sex marriages performed in
Hawaii. See supra notes 157-58. Congress and President Clinton have given federal statutory
support to these arguments through the Defense of Marriage Act. See supra note 159.
208. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing Jones v. Daly, in which a Cali-
fornia court found that no part of a same-sex cohabitation contract could be severed from the
overall meretricious nature of the contract).
209. See Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
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force the parties' actual intent regardless of the judge's subjective view of the
moral valence of their intent further protects gay people who seek to fill statu-
tory gaps through contract. Contract may not be everything gay people have
wished for, but it beats getting nothing or jail time.
The number of federal, state, and local protections for gay people nicely
illustrates that it may be easier for gay people to obtain protection from small
rather than large groups. No federal law protects gay people from sexual
orientation discrimination.2 ' In contrast, nine states and the District of
Columbia protect against sexual orientation discrimination."' Moreover, 163
municipalities have ordinances protecting gay people from discrimination.2 2
Finally, at least 350 companies and universities contractually protect their
employees or students from discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion."'
These numbers are of course partially a function of the fact that there is
only one federal government, only 50 states, many more than 163 municipali-
ties, and many, many more than 350 companies and universities in the United
States. But the Human Rights Campaign data regarding numbers of companies
with non-discrimination clauses is underinclusive. It does not, for example, list
the University of Denver, which has granted protection against sexual orienta-
tion discrimination since 1992, as all accredited American law schools are re-
quired to do.2 4
Of course the smallness of the group does not guarantee that gay people
will succeed in their arguments. If the judge or corporate president is an anti-
210. But see Rivera, supra note 171 (discussing limited protection from sexual orientation
discrimination enjoyed by federal employees). Moreover, in 1995, President Clinton issued Execu-
tive Order 12968 (Aug. 2, 1995), adding sexual orientation to the list of prohibited grounds for
denying a security clearance. John J. Ross, The Employment Law Year in Review, in 25TH
ANNUAL INSTrrtJTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 67 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. H4-5237, 1996). Recently 49 United States Senators in a Republican-controlled Con-
gress voted in favor of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which, if passed, would
have added gay people to the list of groups protected against employment discrimination. But
ENDA did not pass, and the same day Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, defining
marriage as the union between a man and woman and allowing states to refuse to recognize same-
sex unions. Eric Schmitt, Senators Reject Both Job-Bias Ban and Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
211. HRC LIST, supra note 22.
212. Id.
213. Id. Jake Barnes pointed out that my statistics may not withstand strict scrutiny, and may
instead suggest that gay people are more likely to get rights from the states than elsewhere. An-
other way to think of the safety in small numbers rationale is that the least common denominator
may get smaller the larger a group gets. Suppose Americans have 13 possible characteristics,
labelled A-M. City residents may have A-M in common, state residents have only A-F in com-
mon, while Americans as a whole only have A-C in common. Thus cities may protect rights asso-
ciated with A-M, states protect rights associated with A-F, and the federal government would
protect only rights associated with A-C.
214. The AALS requires law schools to not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in
order to maintain their accreditation. However, there may be some exception for religious schools
founded on discriminatory principles. If all accredited law schools contractually protect their em-
ployees and students from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, then at least 150 or
200 entities are added to the HRC list of 350. There are likely other omissions, both in business
and in education. For example, Coors Brewing Co. is not on the list, but accorded its employees
domestic partnership benefits in 1995. Editorial, Separate God and Caesar in Domestic Relations
Law, DENY. POST, Mar. 21, 1996, at B6.
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gay evangelical Christian, or someone like Justice Scalia, gay people have
little likelihood of obtaining any protection.2 5 But gay people are perhaps
better able to shop around for a receptive audience in contract than in legisla-
tion. If an employer refuses to extend contractual protection from sexual orien-
tation discrimination, for example, a lesbian employee could seek work with
another company that is willing to extend the protection. It seems likely that
the same lesbian will find it easier to shop around for another job in the same
area, thus changing only her job, than to move to another city or state when
her city council or state legislature refuses to accord her protection against
sexual orientation discrimination. This second move would require her to make
two major adjustments rather than just one (the job)--if she moved, she would
have to find both a new home and a new job. The financial and non-economic
burdens of changing cities or states seem to be greater than merely changing
jobs in most circumstances. Moreover, Americans cannot shop for a new fed-
eral government, other than by electing new representatives. The fact that
there is only one federal government, which accords almost no protection to
gay people, illustrates the importance of contractual protections where there
are few or no public federal rights.
The relative protections for gay people at the federal, state, municipal, and
corporate levels indicate that as a practical matter, gay people are more likely
to convince one small group which is accountable to another small group
(such as a university or corporation) to afford protection from sexual orienta-
tion discrimination than to obtain this protection from Congress (a fairly large
group answerable to a huge group). This same reasoning suggests that judges
who enforce gay-related contracts are easier to convince under the safety in
small numbers reasoning than legislatures, or even city councils. Thus contrac-
tual purgatory is both feasible and may be the only possible way for gay peo-
ple, a despised numerical minority, to obtain any legal protections.
3. Navigating Around Morality
The third practical advantage of contractual purgatory also turns on the
fact that any agenda for equal rights for gay people must skirt morality as well
as majoritarian sentiment, since most anti-gay arguments are largely or exclu-
sively morality-based. Thus a distinct advantage of contractual purgatory is
that it sidelines moral arguments cloaked as public policy. While some con-
tracts, including those based on meretricious consideration, are not enforceable
because of moral concerns, contracts are generally less susceptible to moral
rhetoric than legislation.
215. Speaking at the University of Colorado before Romer v. Evans was decided, Justice
Scalia told the audience that gay people are not constitutionally protected. Sue Anderson, Knight's
Claim of No Injured Parties Wrong, DENy. POST, Oct. 19, 1995, at B6 (referring to Scalia's "re-
cent" statement that "gays have no constitutional rights"); Robert A. Sirico, Scalia's Dissenting
Opinion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1996, at A12 (describing Scalia's remarks at a Mississippi prayer
breakfast defending Christians counteracting secular humanism by being "fools for Christ's sake");
Scott McLarty, Letters to the Editor: What Worries Justice Scalia, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1996, at
A19 (expressing concern that Justice Scalia's admonition to graduates that they be "fools for




Perhaps resorting to contract because it sidelines moral rhetoric is giving
in too soon to the argument that gay relationships are somehow morally inferi-
or to heterosexual ones. Mary Becker persuasively argues in her comment to
this paper that gay relationships may in fact be morally superior to heterosexu-
al ones because heterosexual male objectification of women is immoral."6
While Becker's arguments carry considerable weight given the gender hierar-
chy in heterosexual relationships, I am less optimistic about winning that par-
ticular battle in my lifetime. Many conservatives see nothing immoral about
male entitlement to female sexuality, and in fact they likely think autonomous
sexuality itself is immoral, in total opposition to Becker's position. It is pre-
cisely because completely opposite positions can both be argued on moral
rhetoric that I find contract more tempting than moral arguments. Moreover, if
advocates for gay personhood argue on multiple fronts (moral, contractual, and
others), the multiple approaches themselves may increase the chances of suc-
cess.
Criminal penalties for victimless crimes are grounded only in morali-
ty,"1 7 as is opposition to gay marriage and other public rights for gay people.
The frequency of Biblical justifications offered by the Religious Right in favor
of anti-gay initiatives and other anti-gay efforts vividly illustrates that the only
imaginable objection to homosexuality is on moral grounds. A recent example
of morality-instigated fervor against gay rights is the recent rash of legislative
action attempting to stem any effect of same-sex marriages which might be
performed in Hawaii. At least 35 states considered and/or passed legislation
explicitly providing that only opposite-sex marriages will be recognized.2 8
Thus any method which rests on rhetoric other than moral rhetoric is well
suited to pursue gay interests.
Once morality is sidelined, gay people have a chance of obtaining some
legal recognition which similarly situated heterosexuals routinely enjoy. Classi-
cal contract rules such as the parol evidence rule provide one route around
moral rhetoric. These classical contract rules are particularly powerful because
they may counteract the majoritarian morality conservative judges otherwise
might be inclined to insert into a contract case.
Assuming judges who are politically conservative are likely to invoke
majoritarian morality to deny gay people rights,"9 and the parol evidence
216. Becker, supra note 34.
217. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 439 ("The Model
Penal Code takes the position that private immorality should be beyond the reach of the penal
law."); FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 10 ("Criminal justice tells us where the moral boundaries
are.").
218. Dunlap, supra note 158, at A24; Smothers, supra note 22, at 25 (16 states recently
passed legislation refusing to recognize same-sex marriage); see also William Eskridge, Credit Is
Due, NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1996, at 17 (describing how, in anticipation of Hawaii recognizing
same-sex marriage, "nine states-and counting-have adopted legislation to block their courts
from giving full faith and credit to Hawaii same-sex unions. The last time so many states declined
to recognize marriages performed elsewhere was the Southern refusal to accord full faith and
credit to different-race marriages."). Congress and President Clinton attempted to achieve the same
result by enacting the Defense of Marriage Act.
219. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring) ("To
hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to
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rule is often popular among this brand of judges,22 ° the parol evidence rule
may counteract these judges' tendency to moralize. Thus, the very judges who
are inclined by personal moral feelings to deny gay rights may be the same
ones who would be swayed by classical contract doctrines such as the parol
evidence rule. As a result, gay people may paradoxically obtain legal
protections from conservative jurists, as long as the parties can cloak their
claims in conservative legal doctrine.
4. Tolerance on the Way to Support
An additional benefit to moderating the public extremes through contrac-
tual purgatory is that it might pave the way for future gay public rights. For
example, assuming that some judges recognize same-sex cohabitation con-
tracts, they will realize that the world continues to turn despite their recog-
nition. The greater heterosexual community may, in turn, see that an enforced
same-sex cohabitation contract does not bring on the destruction of western
civilization. In the terms of my model, enforcing gay cohabitation and non-
discrimination contracts will demonstrate that there is no inherent harm in
same-sex relationships, and since there is no victim, criminalization is not
justified. In time, perhaps these realizations will lead to the logical conclusion
that public rights can be accorded gay people without rending the fabric of
society.
Many years after these realizations occur, perhaps Congress will be will-
ing to enact gay rights legislation and judges be willing to enforce it without
qualifying it to accommodate invidious stereotypes.22" ' If the hands-off rheto-
ric of contract enables lawmakers to entertain the notion that gay people have
lives and loves which deserve legal recognition just as heterosexuals do, then
perhaps with time these same judges will recognize constitutional claims to
equal protection of gay people beyond merely granting a level playing field as
established in Romer v. Evans. And perhaps legislators will be more likely to
lift the bans on gay marriage, family, and military service.
Purgatory is generally conceived' as a place where sinful souls are purged
of sin in order to be fit for heaven. Viewed in this lens, contractual purgatory
may purge sexual marginorities of their sinfulness to prepare them for public
rights. But purgatory may be seen instead to purge the sinfulness of the law. If
the law is unjustifiably biased against sexual marginorities, then it should
spend some time in purgatory to cleanse itself of that sin. In time, then, the
cast aside a millennia of moral teaching."); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("Amendment 2 is designed to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morali-
ty favored by a majority of Coloradans, and is ... an appropriate means to that legitimate end.").
220. See e.g., Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988),
and discussion of its approach to the parol evidence rule supra note 26. Perhaps the objective
label on classical contract rules appeals to conservative judges. As far as gay people are con-
cerned, it does not matter whether objectivity is possible if the label objective dampens judges'
willingness to impose their subjective moral judgments on parties.
221. See, e.g., Big Brother, Inc. v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 284 N.W.2d 823
(Minn. 1979) (refusing to enforce Minneapolis gay rights ordinance to prevent Big Brothers from
inquiring into prospective big brothers' sexual orientation and telling mothers of little brothers that
a prospective big brother is gay).
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law will be fit to recognize gay public rights.222 But contractual purgatory
may not be a heavenly solution.
A downside of contractual purgatory is that it might be permanent instead
of a way station. Catholic doctrine suggests that purgatory is a place souls go
to be purged of evil prior to passing on to heaven. But limbo is the place that
souls go permanently when they do not qualify for eternal salvation. Limbo is
perhaps better than eternal damnation, but it does not hold much hope for the
future.223 If my model of contractual purgatory is in fact contractual limbo,
then it is likely not worth much, particularly since Romer v. Evans and Baehr
v. Miike suggest the possibility that gay people may indeed achieve public
rights sometime in the near future. But until we can determine whether the
contractual way station is purgatory or limbo, it seems contractual purgatory is
something valuable to consider in the arsenal of arguments in favor of gay
rights.
It may even serve a movement's long term interests to spend some time
in contractual purgatory. The progressions of other sexual regulations suggest
that perhaps some sexual issues can be purged of controversial content by
spending some time in contractual purgatory rather than going directly from
public condemnation to public rights. Abortion, for example, is literally all
over the map on my model.
Abortion has progressed from being decriminalized, to being criminalized,
to being briefly a public right, and is now arguably inching toward contract
given restrictions on public funding. There are at least two explanations for
abortion's peripatetic status. Perhaps the lack of consensus about whether a
victim is implicated in abortion has sent it careening between public rights and
public condemnation. Or perhaps the contested status of the fetus is due to the
quick transition in 1973 when abortion went rapidly from being a crime to a
public right through Roe v. Wade.224 Certainly the Religious Right has accu-
mulated much of its vast war chest on moral rhetoric condemning abortion.
Anti-choice activists are raising arms against abortion providers and support-
ers, and anti-abortion legislation is regularly introduced at the state and federal
level. If Roe was supposed to be a quick fix to transform abortion from a
crime to a public right, perhaps the Roe backlash suggests that gay people may
be better served by seeking refuge in contractual purgatory rather than further
raising the crusader hackles of the Religious Right.
On the other hand, the Christian Right makes so much money on the basis
of its anti-gay maneuvers that it is unlikely that any intermediate step would
cool their ardor. But an intermediate step is not easy fodder for rhetoric and
fundraising. Perhaps granting contractual rights for gay people obscures the
222. 1 thank Julie Nice for this insight.
223. Sheryl Scheible-Wolf made this point in her comments on this article at the New Private
Law conference.
224. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has suggested that perhaps abortion should
have been accorded constitutional protection more gradually. Ruth B. Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (Roe may have
encouraged anti-abortion measures by holding so broad a right to abortion).
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target, potentially frustrating the Right's crusade to maintain marriage and
family (not to mention military service) as exclusively heterosexual rights.
B. Theoretical Possibilities
Contractual purgatory may be theoretically subversive in addition to being
practical. Its subversive potential is twofold: (1) it may contribute to the social
construction of gay people as persons, and thus deserving of legal subjecthood
and equality; and (2) it may destabilize hierarchical categories of progressive
and conservative if conservative tools are used for progressive ends. If either
or both of these is true, then contractual purgatory furthers a progressive agen-
da by altering how society constructs gay identity and eroding hierarchy.
1. Constructing Personhood
Perhaps contract is essential to the social construction of personhood, and
thus contractual purgatory is not only useful as a pragmatic intermediate step
to gay people, but may be essential to constructing gay legal personhood.225
If a legal person is one who has both legal rights and duties,226 then gay peo-
ple are legal persons if they have both rights and duties. Certainly gay people
have the duties all other citizens have, including the obligation to pay taxes
and exercise reasonable care in their personal and business affairs. Gay people
also have additional duties, such as the duty to refrain from making sexual
proposals to heterosexuals. Failure to observe this duty has proved deadly for
some gay men, and their assailants have successfully mounted a so-called gay
panic defense. 27
Personhood, like many other things, is socially constructed rather than
natural. Supernatural beings, inanimate objects, and animals have at various
times under various legal regimes been treated as legal persons.228
225. Mary Becker and I focus on different aspects of legal personhood. Her commentary on
this article suggests that moral arguments do not always harm gay rights, but rather can further the
gay rights agenda by exposing the moral superiority of gay over heterosexual relationships. She
reasons that there are more autonomy-denying sexual relations in heterosexual relationships, and
since control over one's sexuality is moral and taking it away is immoral, gay relationships are
morally superior. This reasoning is not inconsistent with my argument, in that we both focus on
personhood.
I contend that personal autonomy should trump majoritarian morality, so that victimless
crimes should be decriminalized, contractualized, or made into public rights. Similarly, Becker
posits that sexual autonomy requires that one have respect for the personhood of a sexual partner.
If men do not respect the autonomy of their female partners, the men deny the women's autonomy
and personhood. I agree with her model, but I focus on another aspect of personhood: contracting.
Sexual autonomy and ability to contract are, of course, only two aspects of legal personhood.
226. JOHN C. GRAY, TIE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27 (1983) ("The technical
legal meaning of a 'person' is a subject of legal rights and duties.").
227. For further discussion of the defense, see Joshua Dressier, When "Heterosexual" Men
Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the 'Reasonable
Man' Standard, 85 N.W. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995) (defending defense as applica-
ble to reasonable heterosexual men); Robert B. Misson, Note, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The
Homosexual Advance as Insufficient, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992) (critiquing the defense as "insti-
tutional homophobia").
228. GRAY, supra note 226, at 41-42, 45, 46-48 (describing how in Europe during the Middle
Ages, God and the saints were legal persons and animals were "summoned, arrested, and impris-
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Gender22 9 and sex23 are also socially constructed. Indeed, according to
Judith Butler, a person who refuses or fails to conform to sex and gender
identity is often treated as if he or she were not a person at all."' If gender
is defined in part as conduct intended to attract the opposite sex,232 then gay
people are likely to fall outside gender norms since they aim to attract the
same sex. As such, gay people are less likely to be deemed legal persons (or
less full legal persons than their heterosexual counterparts). Since states can
criminalize conduct by gay people that would be constitutionally protected
were they heterosexual,233 gay people are clearly less than full legal persons.
But opportunities to enforce gay-related contracts may contribute to the pro-
cess of developing gay people's legal personhood.
Marginorites' legal personhood is constructed in part through legislation
extending rights to them. African-Americans were not persons under American
law until the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution made them so. Simi-
larly, women were not constitutional persons entitled to vote until the 19th
Amendment allowed it. These crucial Amendments formed the cornerstones of
African-American and female legal personhood.
Federal and state statutes further developed African-American and female
personhood. Under U.S.C. § 1981, African-Americans have the same rights to
contract and own property as white people."3  Similarly, the Married
oned, had counsel assigned them for their defence, were defended, sometimes successfully, [and]
were sentenced and executed").
229. BUTLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84, at 25 ("Gender proves to be performative-that is
constituting the identity it is purported to be.... There is no gender identity behind the expres-
sions of gender, that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said
to be its results.").
230. Id. at 7 ("If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called
'sex' is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed perhaps it was always already gender, with the
consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all.").
Butier has further elaborated on this point:
When the sex/gender distinction is joined with a notion of radical linguistic
constructivism ... the "sex" which is referred to as prior to gender will itself be a pos-
tulation, a construction, offered within language, as that which is prior to language, prior
to construction.. . . If gender is the social construction of sex, and if there is no access
to this "sex" except by means of its construction, then it appears not only that sex is
absorbed by gender, but that "sex" becomes something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy,
retroactively installed as a prelinguistic site to which there is no direct access.
BUTLER, BODIES, supra note 84, at 5; see also Franke, supra note 80, at 63 (observing that "sexu-
al identity ... must be understood not in deterministic, biological terms, but according to a set of
behavioral, performative norms").
231. BUtLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84, at 17 ("The very notion of 'the person' is called into
question by the cultural emergence of those 'incoherent' or 'discontinuous' gendered beings who
appear to be persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by
which persons are defined."). In other words, one becomes a subject within sex and gender, when
one is sexed and gendered.
232. Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in To-
WARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 163 (Rayna Reiter ed., 1975) ("Gender is not only an
identification with one sex; it also entails that sexual desire be directed toward the other sex.").
233. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (states may criminalize homosexual
sodomy) with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (states may not interfere with unmarried
heterosexuals' practices regarding birth control).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) ("All persons ... shall have the same right ... to make and
enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens."). Contracts have been a double-edged
sword for African-Americans. Former slaves were kept in conditions resembling slavery under the
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Women's Property Acts allow married women to own property and make
contracts."' More recent statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,"3 provide that private parties
may not discriminate on the basis of race or sex in employment or in extend-
ing credit. These statutes illustrate that certain classes of human beings were
not legally full persons until the law made them so. Similarly, gay people are
not full legal persons because they lack many of the protections that everyone
else enjoys, such as the freedom to marry or to serve in the military. In this
sense full legal personhood would be a collection of public rights in my mod-
el.
This brief outline of the constitutional and statutory developments estab-
lishing African-American and female legal personhood suggests that one is not
necessarily born a legal person, but rather becomes one.237 Judith Butler has
suggested that gender is performative rather than essential: that drag reveals
femininity to be a social construct that can be performed by males or
females.23 Butler reasons that drag queens are biological men who perform
feminine gender, and in doing so destabilize the categories of male and female
by representing the feminine via a male body. She has further argued that sex,
terms of post-Civil War surety and peonage contracts. Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, I GEO. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340, 351-53 (1994). But contracts between freedmen and their employers
both harmed and benefited newly free former slaves. On one hand the contracts gave "extremely
low or nonexistent" wages, allowed planters to interfere with employees' personal lives, allocated
all risk of loss to the employee, allowed the planter to fine the employee for offenses such as
"impudent" language, and mandated that the employee work for a full year. ERIC FONER, RECON-
STRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINIsHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 164-67 (1988). These harsh
terms were hardly freely chosen by the freed men, given the gross inequality in bargaining power
and the Freedmen's Bureaus agents threatening to arrest those who would not sign the contract or
leave the plantation. Id. at 165. However, some Bureau agents facilitated more favorable labor
contracts, and the very presence of the agents (and the Bureau) to oversee planter conduct made it
clear that the planter no longer exercised the absolute authority of a slave owner. Id. at 168. Thus,
while the ideology of freedom to freely enter contracts is not always (or even rarely) reflected in
material reality, the process of bargaining can confer legal personhood on one formerly a legal
object. I thank Katherine Franke for this insight.
235. See, e.g., 1848 U.S. Laws ch. 200 (1848) ("The real and personal property of any female
who may hereafter marry, and which she shall own at the time of marriage, and the rents, issues
and profits thereof, shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts,
and shall continue her sole and separate property, as if she were a single female."). For further
discussion of the importance of the Married Women's Property Act for American women, see
BECKER ET AL., supra note 48, at 7-8; Richard H. Chused, History's Double Edge: A Comment on
Modernization of Marital Status, 82 GEo. LJ. 2213 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of
Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEo. LJ. 2127
(1994).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Equal Credit
Opportunity Act).
237. This point is literally true when one considers that children have fewer speech and due
process rights than adults. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
(allowing schools the power to inculcate moral values by controlling students' speech on pregnan-
cy and divorce in school newspaper) to inculcate moral values); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Frazer, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (allowing school to discipline student for sexual innuendo in speech
to students); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (recognizing students' liberty interest in
procedure prior to corporal punishment but holding that after-the-fact tort remedy sufficed).
238. BUTLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84. Katherine Franke notes that performativity of gender
is constitutive rather than casual, in that most people do not look in the closet and decide what
gender they will be that day. Franke, supra note 82, at 50 n.21 1.
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as well as gender, is socially constructed.23 9 Mary Anne Case, Katherine
Franke, and Francisco Valdes have applied arguments based on the social
construction of sex and gender to the employment discrimination context,
arguing on various grounds that prohibitions of sex discrimination should also
encompass gender discrimination." While both Case and Franke propose
that the law recognize discrimination based on socially-constructed gender as
opposed to only biological sex, Case's analysis applies more directly to my
proposal of contract as an essential element of personhood.
Case reasons that if effeminate men and masculine women are protected
from employment discrimination, the social construction of femininity will
change. Specifically, Case contends that masculinity is valued more highly
than femininity because men are more likely to be masculine and men are val-
ued more than women. As a result, protecting effeminate men will lead to
protecting feminine women. My argument extends Case's reasoning to the
construction of personhood.
Just as Case argues that protecting effeminate men will be an incremental
move that ultimately benefits feminine women, I argue that enforcing gay-
related contracts is an incremental move that seems like crumbs in comparison
to public rights but will ultimately benefit gay people because it contributes to
the social construction of gay people as legal persons. In other words, it con-
tributes to their transformation from legal objects to legal subjects.
As gay people form cohabitation and gay-related employment contracts,
and as judges enforce them, the social construction of gayness may change.
Specifically, gay people may move along my model away from
criminalization, into contractual purgatory, and toward public rights. This
transition from legal object to legal subject is a 180-degree transition that may
require a mid-way stop to account for the extreme nature of the change. Under
this analysis, contractual purgatory is not merely the half loaf gay people must
settle for because they cannot afford a full one, but rather an essential step in
the social transformation from people who do not count to people who do.
2. Master Carpentry
The second theoretical implication of contractual purgatory inverts Audre
Lorde's famous quip that the master's house cannot be taken apart with the
master's tools.24 ' The film Babe again illustrates the potential power of con-
tractual purgatory.
One radical reading of Babe is that no animals should be food for people;
this interpretation suggests to children that there is something terribly wrong
with eating meat (particularly pork). Another radical reading of the film chal-
lenges barnyard hierarchy A ]a George Orwell24 2 to suggest that even the
239. BUTLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84, at 7.
240. Case, supra note 83; Franke, supra note 80; Valdes, supra note 2.
241. Nancy Ehrenreich makes a similar point in her commentary in this Symposium: The Pro-
gressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1235 (1996).
242. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1946). The famous line, "All pigs are equal but some
pigs are more equal than others" satirizes the doublespeak of those simultaneously asserting power
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most lowly member of the barnyard may have untapped talents. Generalizing
this point leads to a generic rationale for equal opportunity under law: every
one has unique contributions to make and opening up the field to new con-
tenders will yield new methods of problem solving and perhaps better results.
Both readings are essentially anti-hierarchical, and as such seem to serve a
progressive agenda. Crooke v. Gilden yields numerous similar messages.
Just as Babe won the sheepherding competition against all odds, Gilden
won her case. As Babe escaped the slaughterhouse (and the social status of
proto-bacon), Gilden escaped the netherworld of social invisibility where an
ended romance is socially constructed as totally insignificant. Finally, Babe
showed the world that pigs (or at least this pig) can herd sheep better than
sheepdogs, using coping skills developed to get along with barnyard animals
who perceived him as dimwitted proto-pork. Similarly, Gilden might find that
her enforced business/relationship agreement shows the world that she can
carve out a place for her relationship to be socially (if incompletely) recog-
nized. In doing so, Gilden elevates the romance from total invisibility or con-
demnation to legal visibility where the partners' agreement-is enforced by the
judiciary.
On a more theoretical level, Babe makes apparent the injustices of barn-
yard hierarchy, while Crooke v. Gilden demonstrates the advisability of allo-
cating loss according to prior agreement in romance, just as is done in a com-
mercial context. In doing so, Crooke v. Gilden illuminates the underlying eco-
nomic arrangements in most romantic relationships, and may even lead some
heterosexuals to contract and thus protect themselves from sacrificing finance
to romance. In sum, judicial enforcement of same-sex cohabitation contracts
may well contribute to the reshaping of gayness from something criminal to-
ward something worthy of public rights, stopping at contract along the way.
Moreover, Gilden shows the advisability of relationship conracting just as
Babe developed new sheepherding techniques.
Adding Judith Butler to the BabelCrooke v. Gilden analysis yields yet
another level of theoretical significance to contractual purgatory. Butler has
applied her gender performativity theory to suggest that the people I call sexu-
al marginorities might subvert power dynamics by using the very tools that are
used against them.243 Inverting legal norms may thus further a feminist agen-
da by undermining the current social construction of power.2" By that
reasoning, gay people using contractual tools that have been widely assumed
to be the master's tools may chip away at the master's house.245 If most of
and claiming all are equal.
243. BUTLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84, at 45 ("There is only a taking up of the tools where
they lie, where the very 'taking up' is enabled by the tool lying there.") and 47 ("The critical task
[for feminism] is ... to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions
[of identity], to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those
practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the imminent possibility of
contesting them.").
244. See Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 84, at 1973.
245. See Testy, supra note 4, at 230 (using the familiarstatement of Audre Lorde to suggest
that "perhaps it is only the master's tools that will dismantle the master's house. That is, perhaps
it is more effective to reconstruct contract rather than to pretend we can ignore or abandon this
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us assume only powerful people use contractual tools to get around hostile
default rules, and gay people are not generally powerful, then gay people
using contractual tools blurs the distinction between powerful people and less
powerful ones, or at least between each group's tools.
This subversion may counteract the dangers inherent in closeting oneself
to obtain contractual relief as Gilden did in Georgia. For perhaps Gilden will
be like Babe, the pig in collie's clothing, who will contribute to a transfor-
mation of the social construction of relationships from being understood as
purely emotional and romantic to being recognized as having pragmatic eco-
nomic elements as well." More ambitious is the additional possibility that
contractual recognition of sexual marginorities' lives might contribute to a
broadening of the definition of family from the heterosexual dyad with biolog-
ical offspring to multiple parties and various forms of roles and responsibili-
ties.
Finally, Gilden's use of business planning to protect her personal interests
destabilizes elements of hierarchy by obscuring the players through use of
each other's tools.247 Thus the dyads of left/right and commercial/personal
may be destabilized by contractual purgatory. In doing so, contractual purgato-
ry creates social space for redefining the categories, perhaps in a way that en-
hances marginorities' personhood. Contractual purgatory may further contrib-
ute to a reconceptualization of what contract means if the individualistic tool
becomes essential to the liberation struggle of groups of sexual
marginorities.2"
VI. CONCLUSION
Classical contract is apparently amenable to progressive uses, at least
regarding regulation of gay sexuality through the private purgatory of contract.
Since New Private Law is firmly grounded in a preference for private con-
tracts over public entitlements, gay-related contracts paradoxically serve the
interests of New Private Law despite its association with a right-wing political
agenda. Thus, New Private Law is apparently amenable to progressive uses, at
least regarding regulation of gay sexuality. It may provide gay people a way
station en route to public rights such as gay marriage. Or perhaps it is a re-
basic institution.").
246. Martha Fineman and Cynthia Starnes have both advocated a contractual or business
model of romantic relationships. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER 20TH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (proposing business model for romantic
relationships and family definition by parent and child rather than marriage); Cynthia Starnes,
Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts
and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993) (proposing partnership buyout
model for marital dissolutions).
247. Of course Gilden wins at Crooke's expense. Both are lesbians and the contest between
them is largely zero-sum. However, Gilden wins visibility (partial though it may be) and some
measure of equity flowing from enforcing their previous agreement. Had she won, Crooke's gain
would have been completely individual, and as such is less likely to fit into a progressive agenda,
particularly when it would harm other gay people by ratifying majoritarian moral condemnation of
gays.
248. I thank Dan Farber for this insight.
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spite from the criminalization of sodomy laws. Either way, New Private Law
offers a way for gay people to contract around hostile public default rules
grounded in public moral condemnation of homosexuality. In other words, it
may offer sexual marginorities an opportunity to contract around the hostile
terms of the social contract.
Other sexual regulations seem also to fall into contractual purgatory, par-
ticularly when there is no public consensus on whether there is a victim of a
particular sexual activity. Abortion seems headed for the private way station,
and may slip back to criminalization. But miscegenation, which is widely seen
as a victimless offense, has remained a public right since it was established. If
sexual marginorities can prevail in characterizing their gay sexual orientation
as truly victimless, then perhaps their visit to the way station of contract will
be short-lived.
I have tried to show that sexual regulations often travel a trajectory be-
tween public extremes of condemnation and rights, sometimes finding a mid-
dle ground in contract. And for sexual marginorities, otherwise criminalized
and unlikely to obtain public rights in the near future, that private purgatory is
a strategic tool for exercising rights and escaping majoritarian moral condem-
nation. Theoretically, it may be essential to the construction of gay people as
subjects rather than objects, and also offer a means of using the master's own
tools to reshape power relations. In these circumstances, then, New Private
Law may serve progressive ends.
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